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There are four chapters in this thesis. The first is an introductory chapter, and the remaining 
three are composed of the research papers. The first part of the introductory chapter presents 
the problem of negative externalities, and a discussion of regulation in economics. The common 
theme for the papers is the importance of economic principles for effective regulation. While 
each paper considers different problems and sectors, they all focus on the regulation of negative 
externalities using economic instruments. In the second part of the introductory chapter, a 
summary of the papers is provided. The discussion addresses how the papers contribute to the 
literature, their research focus, the methods used, and the results obtained. 
 
The first paper co-authored with Eirik S. Amundsen, examines the problem facing a regulator 
wanting to achieve a specific target path of CO2-emission reductions in the electricity sector. 
The goal of the paper is to analyze the suitability of a tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme 
in achieving the target set by the regulator. In addition, we examine the incentives for 
construction of new renewable generation capacity. The previous literature on TGC schemes, 
consists mainly of theoretical contributions. They have focused on the interaction of a TGC 
scheme with other instruments, and the effect of using a TGC scheme as an instrument for 
promoting renewable energy or reducing emissions from energy production. Static models have 
been used in the analyses in these contributions. Our paper is a novel contribution to the TGC 
literature by using a dynamic model. Contrary to static models, a dynamic model allows us to 
analyze time-related issues. We examine price profiles for electricity and investment profiles 
for new green generation capacity, resulting from technological progress in green generation 
technology. We also have a specific focus on the calibration of the time-path of percentage 
requirements, the key component in a TGC scheme. Previous contributions in the TGC 
literature have treated the percentage requirement as given. Finally, we compare the results 
from using a TGC scheme with results derived from using an emission fee and a green subsidy, 
and conduct a welfare ranking of the instruments. Our results show that the use of a TGC 
scheme will reduce emissions from fossil-based electricity generation. Further, we find that 
with a properly calibrated time path of percentage requirements, a TGC scheme can achieve the 
specific target path announced by the regulator. However, regardless of the time path chosen,  
the use of a TGC scheme  leads to overinvestment in green generation capacity compared with 
the optimal social solution. Moreover, the price path for electricity will fall below the socially 
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optimal level, resulting in overconsumption of electricity. While a TGC scheme is not as cost-
effective as the emission fee, it is less wasteful than the subsidy. 
 
The second paper examines whether a refunded emission payments (REP) scheme can be used 
as a cost-effective instrument achieving a dynamic emission target for NOx emissions. With a 
REP scheme, a charge is put on the regulated firms' emissions, and the revenues are recycled 
back to the firms.  I look at the problem where a regulator wants to reduce emissions in 
accordance with an exogenously given target path, and first-best emission pricing is assumed 
unavailable due to political constraints. The emitting firms are heterogenous and emit NOx 
through energy production. Emissions can be reduced by cutting output or by investing in new 
abatement technology. I analyze two REP schemes and examine their incentives for emission 
mitigation at the firm level. In the first version, refunds are given based on the emission cuts of 
the firms, and the second version gives refunds in proportion to energy produced. In the REP 
literature, the focus has been mainly on output-based refunding, and its incentives for emission 
reductions. These analyses have been conducted with static models. There have also been 
papers examining the incentives provided by a REP scheme for adoption of abatement 
technologies. The paper contributes to the REP literature in several regards. First, to the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze REP schemes using a dynamic model. This 
allows me to investigate time-variant issues such as the time path of instruments and the 
evolution of mitigation incentives for firms. Second, I derive analytical expressions and  
conditions for a REP scheme able to achieve cost-effective regulation of NOx-emissions. Third, 
by assuming heterogenous firms, I can compare mitigation incentives for different firm types 
across the two REP schemes and look at the distributional outcomes for different firm types 
with the two instruments. Both REP schemes can achieve the specific target path of emission 
reductions. However, it is only cost-effective when all emission cuts are eligible for refunds. 
The choice of refund affects the costs of regulation and distributional outcome for different firm 
types. My results suggest that if a Pigouvian tax is unavailable, then a REP scheme is not 
necessarily an inferior second-best alternative. 
 
The third and final paper of the thesis is concerned with the regulation of negative externalities 
from road transport. Using a partial equilibrium model, I analyze the problem of transport 
choice for a fixed number of commuters who make an essential work trip in a congested urban 
area. The commuters use either fossil car, electric car, or public transport. Each alternative is 
responsible for a different composition of negative externalities. The long-term equilibrium 
iv 
 
outcomes for transport choice in the private and socially optimal outcomes are analyzed, and I 
discuss the importance of economic principles for optimal regulation of the externalities. There 
is a rich strand of literature on negative externalities from road transport. While congestion has 
received much attention, the literature has expanded to include externalities such as global and 
local emissions, accidents, and noise. There have been many contributions focusing on policy 
instruments to internalize negative externalities from road transport. These include both 
theoretical and empirical papers, studying both command-and-control, and market-based 
instruments. The paper is a contribution to the literature on the regulation of negative 
externalities from road transport. I focus on the difference in the long-run private and socially 
optimal outcomes on the transport choice of commuters and consider the effect from four 
categories of externalities. My approach allows me to study the effect of the different 
externalities on the equilibrium outcomes. This is examined thoroughly, using comparative 
statics. Further, I discuss important economic principles for achieving a socially optimal 
outcome. The inclusion of electric cars enables me to highlight the trade-off in the regulation 
of local and global negative externalities. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other 
papers using a similar setup. The results from the paper show the importance of the different 
externality cost on transport choice, where congestion costs prove to be particularly important. 
An optimal internalization  of the externalities can be achieved with a “sandwich” of economic 
instruments that are differentiated to account for different damage intensities from the various 
vehicle types. This key result is underscored with comparisons of long-run outcomes from 
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The climate problem is one of mankind’s biggest challenges. Averting disaster requires nothing 
less than worldwide collective policy action. However, policies that ignore the laws of 
economics may prove futile, if not downright counterproductive. 
- Hans-Werner Sinn (2015)  
 
1. Background  
The concern of this thesis in environmental economics is the regulation of negative 
externalities. In this introductory chapter, I look at the concept of a negative externality, and 
show the importance of regulation of such a market failure. Further, I examine important 
principles of regulation of negative externalities in economics, with a particular focus on the 
use of market-based instruments. Then, I discuss the difference of static and dynamic analyses 
of policy instruments. Finally, I look at some notable environmental targets and discuss the use 
of market-based instruments in achieving these targets. Throughout this introductory chapter, I 
highlight how my contributions fit in to the different topics concerning the regulation of 
negative externalities.   
 
An external  effect is a market failure. It is an unintended side and uncompensated side effect 
of an agent’s activities on another (Sterner & Coria, 2013). Since the focus of the thesis is on 
negative externalities, I will concentrate on these in the following. Although externalities are a 
basic concept in economics, it remains an important subject of analysis.  
 
The negative externality which has probably received the most attention in recent years is 
climate change. In 2006, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, was released. 
It was a comprehensive report ordered the by the government of United Kingdom, charged with 
studying the effect of global warming on the world economy. The report clearly states that 
climate change could have serious impacts on both growth and development, but that if strong 
action is taken now, the worst impacts of climate change can still be avoided. Calculations 
indicate that in the absence of decisive action, the total costs and risks of climate change can be 
equivalent to a loss of global GDP of at least 5 percent each year from now on. As the report 
states: “Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest example 
of market failure we have ever seen” (Stern, 2007). Since the release of the Stern Review, 
climate change has been a much discussed and researched topic, but the perceived lack of action 
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has also led many to grow impatient for a credible response. In recent years, there has been a 
growing climate concern among young people. Activists such as Greta Thunberg have also been 
instrumental in keeping the consequences of anthropogenic climate change high on the 
international agenda and demanding efficient regulation.  
 
Apart from climate change, local pollutants are another important category of negative 
externalities. While global emissions and the contribution to damages from climate change are 
important, local emissions have a potential to cause adverse health effects and negative impacts 
on nature. One example of local pollutants is nitrogen oxides (NOx) NOx emissions lead to acid 
deposition and eutrophication, causing detrimental effects on both soil and water quality 
(European Environment Agency, 2018).  
 
The transport sector stands out in that it is not only a significant source of annual greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions but is also responsible for various other local externalities that have 
noticeable effects on people’s wellbeing in daily life. Congestion is perhaps the one that has 
received most attention. Although seminal works, discussing the social costs of congestion were 
published decades ago (Vickrey, 1963; Walters, 1961), congestion is still a major problem in 
large urban areas. There are also other externalities linked to the transport sector, such as 
accidents, noise, and road wear.  
 
All three papers in this thesis focus on the regulation of negative externalities. In the first paper, 
we consider the problem where a regulator seeks to reduce GHG emissions from the electricity 
sector. The second paper is concerned with regulation of NOx emissions from energy producing 
firms. In the third, and final paper, I discuss the importance of implementing key insights from 
economics in the regulation of various negative externalities from road transport. 
 
2. Regulation of negative externalities in economics  
The goal in economics is to organize economic efficiency for the benefit of individuals in 
society without wasting resources, i.e., achieving this at the least cost for society. Under the 
very strict necessary assumptions for undistorted competitive markets, the mechanisms of the 
free market could bring about this situation. In practice though, the presence of market failures 
such as externalities, requires some form of regulation. Since the introduction of the concept of 
externalities and the principles of optimal regulation by Pigou (1920), there has been 




This regulation is often considered a public responsibility, but if the problems could be solved 
through private solutions, there would be no need to involve public regulatory bodies. 
Prominent economists such as Ronald Coase, have argued in favor of such private solutions. 
The so-called Coase theorem stated that with a clear assignment of property rights and low 
transaction costs, a private bargain solution could ensure an efficient market outcome in the 
presence of externalities. This result would hold regardless of the initial allocation of property 
rights (Coase, 1960). In practice, there are limits to private solutions when the necessary 
conditions do not hold. High transaction costs (i.e., many parties involved) and problems 
concerning the assignment of property rights (i.e., right to clean air) have shown that public 
involvement in regulation is a necessity to achieve efficient regulation.  
 
The choice for regulators concerning policy instruments can be divided into two main 
categories: command-and-control and market-based instruments. In the former category we 
have instruments such as standards, while market-based instruments can be taxes, subsidies, 
tradable emission permits etc. Generally, economists prefer market-based instruments. Unlike 
command-and-control instruments, they do not specify a certain behavior or impose specific 
solutions for achieving emission targets. With market-based instruments, polluters face either 
price or quantity signals meant to incentivize them to change their behavior. Market 
mechanisms can then be used to achieve an efficient allocation of emission mitigation among 
polluters. Further, since market-based incentives allow polluters more flexibility in their 
abatement efforts, emission mitigation can be achieved at lower costs. Economic efficiency 
through internalization should be done at the least cost to avoid waste of resources. Wasteful 
regulation could also diminish the support for regulation since there are other important areas 
in need of funding as well. It should be noted that even though economist might prefer the use 
of market-based instrument, there are sometimes rationale for using command-and-control 
instruments. This can be the case if emissions cannot be efficiently measured or monitored, or 
to avoid geographic concentration of certain pollution types. Since the concern of this thesis is 
analyses of the use of different market-based instruments, they will be the focus in the 
following. For a discussion on the use of indirect regulation instruments such as standards, I 
refer to other contributions in the literature of instrument choice (see, e.g., Amundsen, Hansen, 




Pigou argued that the use of a corrective (Pigouvian) tax, could be used to internalize negative 
externalities. The conclusions derived by Pigou have later been promoted by William Baumol 
who showed that with regulation of the polluter with a tax set equal to the marginal costs of an 
externality (e.g., pollution) the socially optimal outcome could be achieved (first-best solution). 
Further, there would be no need for additional regulation of those who were affected by the 
externality, in the form of a compensation (Baumol, 1972). The use of a tax on emissions, 
incentivizes the firms to change their behavior and set their marginal abatement costs equal to 
the price. With the use of a tax, the price is fixed, but the quantity of emissions is determined 
by the market. 
 
An alternative to using a price instrument is the use of a quantity instrument, such as tradable 
emission permits. In this system, also referred to as cap-and-trade, the regulator determines the 
total amount of emissions (the “cap”), through the number of permits. The permits are then 
allocated to the regulated firms, either for free or at a cost. With unrestricted trade of permits, 
the optimal internalization of the externality can be achieved, regardless of the initial allocation 
of permits (Montgomery, 1972). Under the condition of a binding emission cap, i.e., a cap lower 
than total emissions, the quantity of emission reductions is given, but the price of the emission 
permits is determined by the supply and demand for permits. 
 
The third main option of market-based instruments is subsidies, where firms receive a payment 
to alter their behavior. If a subsidy is given per unit of emission reduced, below a specified 
baseline level, the instrument can provide the same marginal incentives as a tax or a system of 
tradable emission permits. However, even under idealized conditions, a subsidy is a less cost-
effective instrument since the average costs of the regulated firms decrease. This can result in 
increased entry since it provides non-optimal incentives for output (Baumol & Oates, 1988). 
For these reasons, economists generally prefer taxes or tradable emission permits in favor of 
subsidies in the regulation of negative externalities.  
 
The preceding discussion on instrument use assumes that there is one externality that requires 
regulation, and that optimal use of market-based instruments can internalize this externality and 
achieve the socially optimal outcome. Further, it is also assumed that there are no constraints 
on the choice of policy instruments for the regulating body. In practice, however, such first-
best solutions cannot always be obtained. Regulation is then considered second-best when 




With the absence of additional market failures such as uncertainty and asymmetric information, 
both an emission tax and a system of tradable emission permits could achieve the same efficient 
result. In a second-best setting, however, the effect of using different instrument can be 
different. In his classic paper “Prices vs Quantities”, Weitzman demonstrated that in the event 
of uncertainty, a price and quantity instrument would not result in the same outcome. He 
showed that if there was uncertainty in the marginal cost of supplying a good, then a price 
instrument would be more efficient than a quantity instrument, if the marginal the cost curve 
was steeper than the marginal benefit curve for that good. In the opposite case, a quantity 
instrument would be more efficient. Depending on the relative curvatures of the marginal cost 
and benefit functions, either a price or a quantity instrument would result in the least distortion 
compared to the socially optimal outcome (Weitzman, 1974). For other contributions analyzing 
this important result with the presence of uncertainty, see, e.g., Adar & Griffin (1976), Fishelson 
(1976) and Newell & Pizer (2003). In an extension to Weitzman’s analysis, Robert Stavins 
considers correlated uncertainty for both marginal costs and benefits. He argues that the 
presence of simultaneous and correlated uncertainty can alter the recommendation of the most 
efficient policy instrument (Stavins, 1996).  
 
Kwerel (1977), studies the situation of asymmetric information where the information 
necessary for optimal regulation is known to the regulated firms but not the regulator. This can 
create incentives for firms to deceive the regulator when asked to disclose their information. In 
the context of pollution control, Kwerel shows that depending on whether the regulator 
considers using a price or quantity instrument, the regulated firms can either under- or overstate 
their abatement costs. To induce firms to reveal their true information, Kwerel suggests a 
combination of transferable emission permits and a subsidy per permit more than actual 
emissions, paid to the regulated firms holding permits above their emissions. In their seminal 
paper, Roberts & Spence (1976) argue that when the regulator has insufficient information 
about firms’ abatement costs, a combination of an emission permits scheme with subsidies and 
penalties can reduce the sum of damages from pollution, and abatement costs. For other 
contributions on the use of hybrid instruments, see, e.g., Pizer (2002) and Jacoby & Ellerman 
(2004). 
 
If a polluting industry is characterized by imperfect competition as well, there is an incentive 
to provide insufficient output compared to a competitive situation. If this industry is levied an 
8 
 
emission tax, the existing market failure is exacerbated. In such instances, an efficient 
regulation requires additional instruments (Fischer, 2011; Gersbach & Requate, 2004) 
 
Finally, another obstacle for the optimal regulation postulated by Pigou and others, is a 
constraint on the use of optimal policy instruments. While economic theory has warm thoughts 
about the use of pricing instruments such as emission taxes, this sentiment is not necessarily 
shared by the public or policy makers. Lack of public and political acceptability can arise for 
several reasons, but such constraints can impede the introduction of effective pricing 
instruments (Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006; Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry, 2011; 
Rivlin, 1989). 
 
In the first two papers I look at the use of alternative instruments in instances where pricing 
instruments such as Pigouvian taxes are unavailable. The first paper is concerned with the 
problem facing a regulator who wants to reduce GHG emissions in the electricity sector in 
accordance with a politically determined target path. The objective of the paper is to examine 
the properties of a tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme and study its suitability as a policy 
instrument for reducing GHG emissions. In the second paper, the negative externality 
concerned is emission of NOx from energy producing firms. The regulator seeks to attain a 
specific dynamic emission target in a cost-effective manner. With the assumption that the use 
of a Pigouvian tax is politically unacceptable, the regulator will use a refunded emissions 
payment (REP) scheme to achieve the stated target. 
 
3. From static to dynamic analyses 
Quite a few contributions have used static theoretical models to analyze the properties of 
different policy instruments (see, e.g.,Downing & White, 1986; Milliman & Prince, 1989; 
Spulber, 1985). However, there are several compelling reasons for the use of dynamic analyses 
of the properties of policy instruments. While static equilibriums are obviously interesting, 
environmental targets such as emission reductions, support for renewables and energy 
efficiency are dynamic and can span over many years. Hence, efficient regulation requires 
knowledge about the effects of policy instruments over time. The use of dynamic models also 
allows for investigations of time-related issues such as the dynamic incentives arising from 




Optimal control theory, an important tool in capital theory is very suitable for the use of 
dynamic analyses in environmental economics (Dorfman, 1969). With the combination of 
dynamic analysis and incorporation of stock variables,  the method has been widely applied for 
topics such as economic growth and extraction of natural resources (Sydsæter, Hammond, 
Seierstad, & Strom, 2008). Further, it can be used to derive time paths for policy instruments 
and assess their dynamic properties. It can also be used to examine capacity building of 
variables, such as new renewable generation capacity which I do in this thesis. 
 
The use of dynamic analyses, using optimal control theory have long been an important part of 
natural and resource economics. In the field of resource management, Hotelling models used to 
derive optimal price and extraction paths for non-renewable resources are notable examples of 
dynamic models using optimal control theory (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, & Common, 2003).  
 
Optimal control theory has also proved useful in analyses of the Green Paradox. The term, 
coined by Hans-Werner Sinn, refers to the problem where environmental policies targeting 
carbon emissions result in adverse effects on the environment. The use of demand-side policies 
such as carbon taxes ignore the supply-side effect. Owners of fossil resources can react to 
regulation (or even merely the signal of such regulations) by increasing their extraction, and 
hence carbon emissions (Sinn, 2008). For contributions to the discussion of the Green Paradox, 
see, e.g., Gerlagh (2011), Long (2015) and Van der Ploeg & Withagen (2015). While the 
concern previously was concentrated on the optimal extraction of fossil resources for economic 
growth. the focus has recently turned more towards the negative effects from extracting and 
burning those same fossil fuels.  
 
On the properties of policy instruments for regulation of negative externalities, Ulph & Ulph 
(1994) derive the optimal time path for a carbon tax. Since burning of fossil fuels, which is an 
exhaustible resource, is the main source of CO2 emissions, they point to the literature of 
exhaustible resources and argue that the important property of a carbon tax, is the time path. 
With the backdrop of increased attention towards emission permit markets, several 
contributions emerged, focusing on intertemporal markets for tradable emission permits  (see, 
e.g., Cronshaw & Kruse, 1996).  Rubin (1996) and Kling & Rubin (1997) study the dynamic 
efficiency properties of a system of tradable emission permits. With the use of optimal control 
theory, they focus on intertemporal trading of emission permits, where they consider both the 




The first two papers in the thesis look at the dynamic properties of policy instruments. In the 
first paper, we examine how well suited a TGC scheme is in achieving a specific target path of 
GHG emissions in the electricity sector. Specifically, we consider the incentives from using a 
TGC scheme on reducing electricity generation from fossil sources, and its effect on investment 
in new renewable generation capacity. In the second paper, I study whether a REP scheme could 
be used as a cost-effective instrument for reducing NOx emissions from energy producing firms, 
in accordance with a politically determined target path.  
 
4. Environmental targets and the use of policy instruments 
In the effort to internalize various global and local externalities, a variety of national and 
international initiatives have emerged over the years. These have been accompanied by 
different policy instruments. It is far beyond the scope of this text to give a comprehensive 
review. Instead, I will look at a few notable examples of environmental policy objectives and 
policy instruments. The endeavors made by the European Union (EU) are perhaps the most 
well-known.  
 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, and came into effect in 2005. The objective of the 
Protocol was to commit industrialized countries and emerging economies to reduce greenhouse 
gases in accordance with individual targets. The targets added up to an average emission 
reduction of 5 percent, compared to 1990-levels over the period 2008-2012. An important 
aspect of the Kyoto Protocol was the introduction of market-based instruments such as 
international emission trading, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI) (UNFCCC, 2020b). 
 
In 2015, the Paris Agreement was adopted by 196 signatories and  came into effect the following 
year. The Agreement increased the ambitions from the Kyoto Protocol, and the goal is to limit 
global warming below 2 degrees Celsius, and preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to 
pre-industrial levels. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, there was a bottom-up approach where 
countries submit their plans for climate action that are updated every five year  (UNFCCC, 
2020a).  
 
While the EU had worked on implementing a carbon energy tax as an instrument to reduce 
GHG gases, this never materialized. The EU instead  introduced a system of tradable emission 
11 
 
permits, the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) in 2005 as their main tool to achieve a 
cost-effective reduction of GHGs in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol (Convery, 2009). In 
2007, the EU set forth its 2020 climate & energy package. This included the so-called 20-20-
20 targets, which stipulated: a 20 percent reduction in GHGs from 1990 levels, 20 percent of 
energy in EU to come from renewables, and a 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency. 
While the EU-ETS remained the main instrument for cutting GHG emissions, there were also 
industries not regulated by the emission trading scheme, so-called non-EU-ETS sectors 
(housing, agriculture, waste, and transport (excluding aviation)). In these sectors, EU member 
states adopted national targets (European Union, 2020a). As their contribution to the Paris 
Agreement, the EU proposed the 2030 climate & energy framework. The targets from 2030 
were set to at least: 40 percent cut in GHG emissions1, 32 percent renewable target, and 32.5 
percent improvement in energy efficiency (European Union, 2020b). Further, the long-term 
target of the Paris Agreement is to achieve a climate-neutral world by mid-century. In 
accordance with this, the EU is also aiming for climate-neutral economy by  2050 (UNFCCC, 
2020a). 
 
The targets set by the EU is a good example of long-term environmental targets, coupled with 
the 2030 targets as milestones along the way. To ensure that these targets are met in an efficient 
manner, the dynamic properties of the chosen policy instruments are important. The EU-ETS 
is the centerpiece in the effort by the EU to reduce GHG emissions. As I have discussed above, 
under idealized conditions, a tradable emission permit scheme could be used as a cost-effective 
instrument for pollution control (Montgomery, 1972) and it could achieve the same result as a 
Pigouvian tax (Weitzman, 1974). However, experience with the EU-ETS has shown that when 
idealized conditions are not met, mainly due to political compromises, the first-best outcome 
depicted in the economics literature is not realized. The EU-ETS has received quite a bit of 
criticism. These grievances concern the efficiency to reduce emissions and the ability of the 
instrument to induce long-term technological change due to low permit prices. Over-allocation 
of emission permits, an inflexible supply mechanism and the use of offsets have been cited as 
contributing factors for the challenges facing the EU-ETS (see, e.g., Ellerman & Buchner, 2008; 
Laing, Sato, Grubb, & Comberti, 2013). Recognizing the need for reform, several changes are 
being planned or have been implemented in the EU-ETS design in recent years. For analyses 
 
1 This was later revised upwards to at least 55 percent by 2030. 
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of the reform of the EU-ETS, see, e.g., Perino & Willner (2016), Bocklet, Hintermayer, 
Schmidt, & Wildgrube and Beck & Kruse-Andersen (2020). 
 
In the first paper, we study the use of a Nordic TGC scheme to achieve a dynamic emission 
target in the electricity sector. Our target is like the EU target for GHG emission reductions. 
Their target consists of a final target with milestones underway (i.e., the 2030 target). Further, 
with a binding emission cap that decreases annually, there is a politically determined path of 
emission reductions. In our model, we fill in the gaps by assuming a smooth decreasing target 
path of emission reductions. Versions of a TGC scheme have a quite widespread use. Primarily, 
TGC schemes have been designed to stimulate the construction of new renewable electricity 
generation capacity (for analyses of the effectiveness of a TGC scheme as a support system for 
renewable energy, see, e.g., Aune, Dalen, & Hagem (2012), Dong (2012) and Abrell, Rausch, 
& Streitberger (2019)). However, the main objective is to displace fossil-based electricity 
generation with emission-free, technologies. The static properties of TGC schemes have been 
studied previously (e.g., Amundsen & Mortensen (2001)). Our paper is a novel contribution to 
the TGC literature with the use of a dynamic model to analyze the properties of a TGC scheme 
as a policy instrument to obtain GHG emission reductions.  
 
As mentioned previously, local externalities can also cause considerable damage, and require 
efficient regulation as well. The Gothenburg Protocol concerns the problems of local pollutants 
and has set national emission ceilings for sulfur (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) and ammonia (NH3) (UNECE, 2020). Like the targets set by the EU, the 
Gothenburg Protocol determines long-term emission ceilings for the signatory countries for the 
different pollutants. These targets are set as percentage reductions from their 2005-levels.  
 
The US-based initiative, the Acid Rain Program is perhaps the most well-known initiative 
against local pollutants. Under Title IV of amendments Clean Air Act in 1990, it was 
determined that sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions nationwide in 2000 were to be cut below 50 
percent of the level in 1980. The chosen tool to achieve this was a tradable emission permits 
program for SO2, primarily targeting coal-firing power plants (Stavins, 1998). 
 
In principle, negative externalities such as local pollutant could be handled efficiently by using 
a tax instrument. A tax set equal to the marginal costs of the externality would achieve the first-
best solution. However, in practice, this is not easy to achieve. Further, even if a tax could be 
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implemented, there is no guarantee that the tax is set at a sufficient high level to achieve the 
targets desired by regulators (Johnson, 2007). With this backdrop, the second paper considers 
the problem of regulating emissions of the local pollutants NOx from energy producing firms, 
under the condition that Pigou taxes are infeasible, and the regulator opts for the use of a REP 
scheme instead. A justification for introducing a REP scheme rather than a traditional emission 
tax has also been that it allows for a higher charge level, compared to a tax with no refund 
(Sterner & Isaksson, 2006). I consider a dynamic emission target and examine whether a REP 
scheme can be used as a cost-effective policy instrument to reduce NOx emissions.  
 
After discussing the regulation of global and local emissions and, I turn the attention to the 
transport sector, more precisely, road transport. This sector is responsible for a considerable 
share of annual CO2 emissions globally. The transport sector was responsible for 24 percent of 
direct CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in 2019. Road transport (cars, trucks, buses and 
two- and three-wheelers) accounted for around three-quarters of this (IEA, 2020).  Further, road 
transport is also a source of various local negative externalities that can cause considerable 
damage. While congestion is considered the most costly negative externality stemming from 
road transport in urban areas in peak periods (Small, Verhoef, & Lindsey, 2007), there are also 
other externalities that can severely impact people’s daily life. These include local pollution 
(NOx and particulate matter (PM)) noise and accidents. Traffic is the main source of PM in 
urban areas. Exhaust PM can contribute to respiratory disease or increased incidence of cancer, 
while non-exhaust PM can cause lung-inflammation (Timmers & Achten, 2016). 
 
Over the years, numerous policy instruments have been introduced to curtail the various 
negative externalities from road transport. These include both command-and-control (i.e., 
standards and low-emission-zones) and market-based instruments (e.g., congestion charges, 
fuel taxes, subsidies) (see, e.g., Santos, Behrendt, Maconi, Shirvani, & Teytelboym, 2010). In 
the third paper in the thesis, I highlight the significance of transport choice to the contribution 
of negative externalities and discuss important economic principles for effective regulation. I 
show the necessity of coherent regulation, using targeted instruments to achieve an optimal 
internalization of the negative externalities. This important result is highlighted by analyzing 






5. Summary of the papers  
I now turn to the papers that constitute this thesis. While the papers focus on different sectors 
and problems, each paper is concerned with the regulation of negative externalities and focuses 
on properties of policy instruments. 
 
5.1 Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of 
greenhouse gas mitigation (coauthored with Eirik S. Amundsen) 
Through fossil-fueled generation of electricity, the electricity sector is a considerable 
contributor to global GHG emissions. Hence, reducing carbon emissions from electricity 
generation is a key component in the strategy to reduce the effect of anthropogenic climate 
change (Williams et al., 2012). Reduction of GHG emissions is the cornerstone of international 
initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Accord. Market-based policy instruments 
have been important in the effort to reduce GHG emissions (see, e.g., Metcalf, 2009; 
Tietenberg, 2013). In practice, efficient emission pricing is not necessarily feasible. Hence, in 
this paper, we examine the use of a TGC scheme as a policy instrument to reduce GHG 
emissions in the electricity sector. 
 
In this paper, we study the problem where a regulator seeks to achieve a politically determined 
target path of GHG emission reductions in the electricity sector. Generation stems from two 
sources: renewable (green) and fossil (black) sources, which cause emissions. Using a dynamic 
model with optimal control theory, we explore the properties of a TGC scheme in achieving the 
specific target path. While TGC schemes are primarily designed to incentivize the construction 
of new green electricity generation capacity, the main objective is to replace fossil-based 
electricity generation with emission-free technologies. We focus on emission reductions, 
through reduction of fossil-based electricity. Further, we study the incentives from using a TGC 
scheme on the construction of new green generation capacity. Our contribution is a novel 
addition to the TGC literature with the use of a dynamic model. This allows us to analyze time-
related issues such as price and investment profiles resulting from technological progress in 
green capacity construction. We also analyze the percentage requirement used in TGC schemes 
explicitly. Instead of treating it as exogenously given, we calculate two versions for the time 
path of the percentage requirements. Finally, we compare the outcomes obtained with the use 
of a TGC scheme with those from using an optimal emission fee and a subsidy for generators 




We find that using a TGC scheme reduces emissions from fossil-based electricity generation, 
independent of time path of the percentage requirements chosen. Further, there exists a time 
path for the percentage requirements that can obtain the specific target path of emission 
reductions exactly. However, regardless of the time path chosen for the percentage 
requirements, there will be too much construction of new green generation capacity, compared 
to the outcome desired by the regulator. Hence, total electricity generation exceeds the social 
optimal level. This results in a higher demand for electricity since the price of electricity will 
be too low. For the sake of comparison, we include an emission fee and a green subsidy and 
derive necessary conditions for these instruments to achieve the target path announced by the 
regulator. While the emission fee results in the first-best solution, using a subsidy reduces 
electricity prices considerably and leads to excessive demand for electricity. A comparison of 
social surplus for the three instruments shows that while a TGC scheme is not as cost-effective 
as the emission fee, it produces higher social surplus than the subsidy.  
 
5.2 Refunded emission payments scheme – a cost-effective and politically acceptable 
instrument for NOx emissions reduction 
In addition to its contribution to climate change, emission of NOx has the potential to cause 
considerable local damage as well. Emissions lead to acid deposition and eutrophication, 
causing detrimental effects on both soil and water quality. NOx emissions can also have 
significant adverse impacts on human health. High concentrations contribute to formation of 
local air pollutants and lead to inflammation of the airways (European Environment Agency, 
2018). While an emission fee set at the level of marginal externality costs of NOx emissions 
would result in a first-best solution, a variety of constraints can restrict a regulators’ choice of 
policy instrument. In this paper, I examine the problem facing a regulator who seeks to reduce 
NOx emissions under the assumption that first-best pricing instruments (Pigouvian taxes) are 
unavailable. The paper is then concerned with whether a REP scheme can be a cost-effective 
instrument for achieving a dynamic target of NOx emission reductions. 
 
In a REP scheme, a charge is levied per kilogram of NOx emissions from the regulated firms, 
and the collected revenues are refunded back to the same firms. I examine the problem where 
a regulator seeks to achieve an announced target path of NOx emission reductions from energy 
producing firms. The firms decide on output, which causes the emissions, and investments in 
abatement technology. Hence, the firms have two ways of reducing emissions. I construct a 
dynamic model for the analysis of the use of a REP scheme, and I consider two versions. In the 
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first version, firms receive a refund in accordance with their emission cuts, and in the second, 
they receive a refund in proportion to their output. The firms in the model are heterogenous, 
and I can study the resulting incentives for different firm types from the two instruments. The 
paper provides a contribution to the REP literature in several ways. I provide analytical results 
for a cost-effective REP scheme and derive necessary conditions for this. Further, the use of a 
dynamic model allows me to study time-related issues such as the mitigation incentives for 
different firm types over time, and time paths for policy instruments. The inclusion of 
heterogenous firms also provide an opportunity to study differences in distributional outcomes 
for different firm types. 
 
From the results, I show that a properly derived REP scheme can obtain a cost-effective solution 
to the regulators’ problem. This requires that the firms must be allowed flexibility by making 
all emission cuts eligible for refunds. The necessary REP charge is then lower than the 
Pigouvian tax, and the charge and the refund must be derived such that the sum of these equal 
the Pigouvian tax in a specific way. These results are derived analytically and the time paths 
for the REP charge and refund are calculated. A REP scheme where refunds are given in 
proportion to output can also achieve the specific target path. However, this is not a cost-
effective instrument. Incentives for production adjustments and investments in abatement 
technology are non-optimal, and the necessary REP charge must be higher than the Pigouvian 
tax. By studying heterogenous firms, I show how the two instruments provide different 
mitigation incentives and distributional outcomes for different firm types. In addition, I also 
discuss policy-related issues concerning the use of a REP scheme. Refunding can increase 
support for regulation (Kallbekken et al., 2011) and allow for implementation of higher charge 
levels than otherwise possible (Johnson, 2007). Refunding can also address concerns for 
competitiveness of regulated firms (Sterner & Isaksson, 2006) and carbon leakage (Fischer & 
Fox, 2012; Fischer, Greaker, & Rosendahl, 2017). However, compared to instruments such as 
taxes and auctioned emission permits, a REP scheme does not generate revenue that could be 
valuable for the governmental budget (Goulder, Parry, Williams III, & Burtraw, 1999). Further, 
by refunding revenues back to emitting firms, a REP scheme does not adhere strictly to the 
polluter-pays-principle. To summarize, the findings show that if efficient pricing instruments 






5.3 Transport choice and negative externalities in a congested urban area  
Apart from being a considerable source of global emissions and an important contributor to 
climate change, road transport is responsible for a variety of negative externalities as well. 
These include congestion, local emissions, noise, accidents, and road wear. These externalities 
can negatively affect the daily life for many people and cause considerable social costs. Over 
decades, a comprehensive literature has focused on the regulation of negative externalities from 
road transport. The studied policy instruments include a wide range of command-and-control 
and market-based instruments. I consider a problem of transport choice for commuters where 
congestion costs faced by the commuters play a significant part. Equilibrium outcomes for 
transport choice are analyzed both with and without inclusion of externalities. Further, I discuss 
regulation of the externalities and focus on the importance of key economic principles for 
regulation. 
 
In the paper, I consider the problem of a fixed number of commuters making an essential work 
trip in a congested urban area. They can choose between fossil or electric car or public transport, 
where each mode of transport is responsible for a distinct combination of negative externalities. 
 Using a partial equilibrium model, I analyze optimal transport choice and the effect when 
negative externalities are internalized in long-run equilibrium solutions. Further, I examine how 
the use of economic principles of regulation can ensure an optimal internalization of the 
negative externalities. This outcome is compared with resulting long-run equilibriums when 
different strategies of partial instrument use are applied. Finally, I conduct comparative statics 
for different cost parameters and discuss the long-run equilibriums concerning transport choice 
and regulation. The paper is a contribution to the literature on the regulation of negative 
externalities from road transport, by analyzing long-run equilibrium outcomes for transport 
choice. I am not aware of other papers using a similar setup. The approach allows me to consider 
private and socially optimal outcomes, as well as the possibility to compare long-run outcomes 
from different regulatory strategies. The effect of different negative externalities on transport 
choice are examined. This is explored thoroughly using comparative statics. Finally, the 
inclusion of electric cars as a transport mode enables me to highlight the trade-off in the 
regulation of local and global negative externalities. 
 
I show that with a “sandwich” of economic instruments, the regulator can achieve the socially 
optimal outcome with internalization of the negative externalities. This is a key result, and I 
highlight its importance by analyzing several long-run equilibrium outcomes from partial 
18 
 
instrument use. Three economic instruments and one technical instrument are considered in 
turn, and I show that their use will result in insufficient regulation. Further the results show that 
such a partial strategy can be very costly and result in unintended consequences as well. Using 
comparative statics for different cost parameters, I examine the importance of the different costs 
on transport choice and regulation. Specifically, I note the importance of the congestion costs. 
The results are derived from a stylized model. In practice, things quickly become more 
complicated. Public and political constraints can restrict the choice of policy instruments for 
regulators. However, effective regulation of transport-related externalities is important, and 
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Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument 
of greenhouse gas mitigation1 
 
 




We consider a regulator who seeks to achieve a specific target path of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions in the electricity sector. Generation stems from two sources: renewable (green) and 
fossil (black) sources, which cause emissions. We construct a dynamic model and explore the 
suitability of a tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme for solving this problem. Further, we 
study the resulting incentives for construction of new green generation capacity. We provide a 
novel contribution to the TGC literature by using a dynamic model that allows analyses of time-
related issues that are inaccessible with static models. Further, we focus explicitly on calibration 
of the time path of percentage requirements. We devise two specific time paths and show that 
the use of a TGC scheme can achieve a specific dynamic emission target but always results in 
overinvestment in new green generation capacity. We also derive results from using an emission 
fee and a green subsidy, compare the different instruments, and conduct a welfare ranking. A 
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The electricity sector is a major contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission through fossil-
fueled electricity generation. Hence, reducing carbon emission from electricity generation is a 
key component in the strategy to reduce the effect of anthropogenic climate change (Williams 
et al., 2012). In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of a system of tradable green certificates 
(TGCs) in achieving a specific target path of GHG emission reductions in the electricity sector. 
 
Tradable green certificate schemes4 are primarily designed to stimulate the construction of new 
renewable electricity generation capacity, but the main objective is to replace fossil-based 
electricity generation with emission-free technologies. With a TGC scheme, a separate market 
for green certificates is created and linked to the electricity market. The regulator allocates 
certificates to generators of renewable electricity in accordance with electricity generated. The 
certificates are sold on the certificate market and compensate generators of renewable electricity 
in addition to the wholesale price of electricity. Since electricity is a homogenous good, the 
regulator must create a demand for TGCs to ensure a well-functioning market. Retailers of 
electricity are therefore obligated to hold a certain share of certificates out of the total demand 
for electricity that they sell to consumers. This share is the percentage requirement. The TGC 
scheme is ultimately financed by consumers of electricity since the costs of the certificates are 
passed on to them. The objective of the TGC scheme is to render green electricity more 
competitive over time5. A TGC scheme is a self-contained system where the regulator 
(government) is not directly involved in giving subsidies and levying taxes. The role of the 
regulator is to announce the time path of the percentage requirement, issue certificates and 
ensure compliance in the scheme. 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether a TGC scheme can be used as a cost-effective instrument 
to achieve a specific target path of emission reductions announced by the regulator in the 
electricity sector. The electricity sector consists of two sources of electricity generation: 
renewable (green) and fossil (black) sources, the latter of which is responsible for GHG 
emissions. Optimal carbon pricing can be used to internalize negative external effects from 
emissions (see, e.g., Metcalf, 2009; Tietenberg, 2013). However, introducing such an 
 
4 In this paper, we analyze a TGC scheme such as the Nordic TGC scheme. 
5 With a technological neutral scheme, the most mature renewable technologies will enter the market. The 
system can be adapted to stimulate investments in less mature technologies by giving more certificates to these. 
This concept of “banding” was an important feature in the Renewables Obligation scheme in the UK (Woodman 
& Mitchell, 2011). 
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instrument can be politically infeasible. Hence, it is interesting to explore whether a TGC 
scheme can work as an effective substitute. Further, we consider the effects of using a TGC 
scheme on the investment in new green generation capacity. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first paper to analyze the use of a TGC scheme with a dynamic model. A dynamic model, 
in contrast to existing static models, enables analyses of time-related issues such as price and 
investment profiles resulting from technological progress in green capacity construction. 
Hence, this is a novel addition to the TGC literature. For comparison, we analyze the outcomes 
of using an emission fee and a green subsidy. We also look at the resulting price paths and 
conduct a welfare ranking of the different instruments. The question of the effectiveness of a 
TGC scheme as an instrument for emission reductions has real-world policy relevance. 
Variations of TGC schemes are used in various places, including Norway, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, and several states in the US6. 
 
Notably, the objective of the paper is not to derive an optimal path for GHG emission 
reductions. Instead, we assume that the regulator announces a specific target path of emission 
reductions to be achieved in a cost - effective manner. The target path itself may be the result 
of political decisions in the economy considered. Hence, we do not claim that this target path 
is socially optimal (However, even if the target path were optimal, it would not alter the 
necessary mechanisms for obtaining it which we examine in this paper). The objective of our 
regulator is comparable to other recognized policy objectives. For instance, the European Union 
has a commitment to reduce CO2 emission in accordance with a specific path as determined by 
an emission cap, where the number of issued quotas decreases annually through a percentage 
reduction7.  
 
The use of an exogenous emissions reduction target to analyze different instruments is well 
established in the economics literature (see, e.g., Fell & Linn, 2013). Abrell, Rausch, & 
Streitberger (2019) assess optimal policies for supporting renewable energies and compare their 
cost-effectiveness against an exogenous emission target. Coulomb, Lecuyer, & Vogt-Schilb 
(2019) derive the optimal transition from coal to gas and renewable energy in the presence of 
an exogenous cap on carbon emissions. Since we use a target path of emission reductions, we 
 
6 In the US, the system of tradable green certificates is known as a renewable portfolio standard (RPS). 
7 An alternative is the implementation of a price target, with a specified price path for CO2 emissions, which can 
be achieved with different instruments, but the resulting emission quantities would differ. Since the primary 




do not include a damage function to describe the evolution of emissions over time. Instead, the 
cost of the negative externality effect of GHG emission is expressed through the shadow price 
of the emission constraint. Further, we focus on the negative externality of one type of emission 
in one market. This feature is then adequately captured with the shadow price. However, if we 
analyzed damages in several markets in a global model, a damage function would be more 
appropriate.  
 
The problem studied in this paper, is the regulation of a negative externality in the form of GHG 
emissions in the electricity sector. Since the emissions stem from the generation of fossil-based 
electricity, the regulation entails a decarbonization of the electricity sector, with an energy 
transition from fossil to renewable based electricity generation. Ambec & Crampes (2019) and 
Abrell, Rausch, & Streitberger (2019) discuss the decarbonization of the electricity sector, and 
asses different support schemes for renewable energy. These contributions differ from our paper 
with their focus on the intermittency of renewable energy sources. Neetzow (2019) looks at 
decarbonization of the power system in the presence of flexible generation and variable 
renewable energies (VREs). He determines an optimal transition from fossil to renewable 
generation, rather than examining the achievement of a given emission target as we do. 
Pommeret & Schubert (2019) conduct a similar analysis but they include investments in energy 
storage in their analysis as well. Helm & Mier (2019) show that if the externality cost of fossils 
is internalized with a Pigouvian tax, then under perfect competition, the optimal energy mix of 
fossil and renewables is achieved. Coram & Katzner (2018) and Coulomb, Lecuyer, & Vogt-
Schilb (2019) study the optimal transition from fossil-based to renewable energy with the use 
of optimal control theory. While the former derives an optimal strategy for energy transition, 
the latter includes nonrenewable resources and investment under adjustment costs in the 
analysis. Hence, both papers differ from the setup that we use. 
 
There is a comprehensive strand of literature on instrument choice for regulating negative 
externalities in economics. For a review on the use of market-based instruments such as taxes, 
subsidies and tradable emission permits see, e.g., Dröge & Schröder (2005), Hepburn (2006), 
Goulder & Parry (2008), Metcalf (2009) and Tietenberg (2013). As previously mentioned, a 
TGC scheme is primarily designed to incentivize the construction of new renewable electricity 
generation capacity. However, with an increasing capacity of green electricity generation, 
fossil-based electricity generation will be crowded out. Further, with our comparison of 
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outcomes with a TGC scheme to those using an emission fee and a green subsidy, our paper 
contributes to the literature on instrument choice.  
 
In the literature on the properties of a TGC scheme, several papers have examined the 
interaction effects between a TGC scheme and other instruments (Amundsen & Bye, 2018; 
Amundsen & Mortensen, 2001; Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2010; Fischer & Preonas, 2010; Meran 
& Wittmann, 2012; Unger & Ahlgren, 2005). Using a stylized model, Amundsen & Mortensen 
(2001) show that in general, an increase in the percentage requirement does not result in a higher 
capacity of green electricity in the long run, but the share of green electricity out of the total 
demand for electricity will increase. Böhringer & Rosendahl (2010) show that the combination 
of a TGC scheme (labeled “green quota” in their paper) and CO2 emission regulation is not 
cost-effective for reducing emissions since the TGC scheme effectively reduces the shadow 
price of the emission constraint. Other contributions have analyzed the properties of a TGC 
scheme with the inclusion of uncertainty (Amundsen, Baldursson, & Mortensen, 2006);  in the 
presence of market power (Amundsen & Bergman, 2012; Amundsen & Nese, 2017); and with 
cross-country integration of certificate markets (Amundsen & Nese, 2009). We expand the 
literature by conducting a dynamic analysis of the suitability of using a TGC scheme as an 
instrument to reduce GHG emissions. 
 
Although TGC schemes have been mostly analyzed as a support scheme for renewables, there 
are some papers that have examined the properties of TGC schemes as an instrument to reduce 
GHG emissions. Palmer & Burtraw (2005) assess the cost-effectiveness of different policies in 
reducing GHG emissions in the electricity sector. They analyze the effect of a renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS) for different levels of the percentage requirement. Their numerical 
analysis shows that although the RPS is effective in promoting the generation of renewable 
energy, it is less efficient as an instrument to reduce emissions. Fischer & Newell (2008) 
compare different policies for reducing GHG emissions and promoting renewable energy. They 
find that a RPS can crowd out emitting energy generation but provides insufficient incentives 
for energy conservation. Hence, higher expansion in renewable energy is required to achieve 
the given emission target. Ambec & Crampes (2019) and Abrell, Rausch, & Streitberger (2019) 
compare the cost-effectiveness for  support schemes with intermittent renewable sources 
against an exogenous emission target. Both papers show that the use of an RPS cannot be 
socially optimal since the revenue-neutrality of the instrument provides insufficient incentives 
for energy conservation. Our paper contributes to the literature on the use of a TGC scheme as 
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an instrument for reduction of GHG emissions in several ways. We use a dynamic model to 
analyze the properties of a TGC scheme. Further, optimal control theory is applied to examine 
the incentives from using a TGC scheme on the construction of new green generation capacity. 
Finally, we focus explicitly on the calculation of the percentage requirement rather than treating 
it as exogenous. In addition, time paths are derived for the percentage requirement to assess the 
dynamic properties of a TGC scheme. 
 
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model along with 
corresponding assumptions. Section 3 first examines a base scenario in which no regulations 
are imposed. Then, solutions from solving the regulator’s problem are derived. The paper next 
examines the use of a TGC scheme in more general terms. In section 4, we analyze and discuss 
the effects of specific time paths of the percentage requirement in a TGC scheme, which are 
compared with the outcomes of using an emission fee and a green subsidy. An illustrative 
numerical model is used to enhance the understanding of our results where necessary. Section 
5 discusses policy implications and provides concluding remarks. 
  
2. A dynamic model8 
In accordance with established policies such as the EU target for emission reductions, we focus 
on a target where the regulator wants to reduce the quantity of GHG emissions as given by an 
announced target path. The model focuses on the electricity market, with two kinds of electricity 
generation, green (𝑧t) and black (yt), the latter of which is the cause of emissions. For 
simplicity, we assume a one-to-one relationship between black electricity generation and 
emissions. In equilibrium we must have that supply equals demand in each period, such that 
xt = yt  +  𝑧t, where xt denotes the demand for electricity. While there are two distinct sources 
of electricity generation, consumers do not distinguish between them. They only demand 
electricity, regardless of its source of generation. We assume perfect competitive markets all 
around. Two types of active decision makers exist: generators and consumers of electricity. 
Hence, since our qualitative results will not be affected, we assume that retailers and distributors 
are simply intermediaries between generators and consumers. Further, we follow Amundsen & 
Nese (2009) and assume that retailing and distribution of electricity are costless for simplicity. 
The wholesale price of electricity is wt, and the end-user price of electricity is denoted by pt. 









We assume that the generation of green electricity always takes place at full capacity utilization 
(zt = z̅t). The corresponding rationale is that the marginal costs of electricity generation from 
the most mature technologies, such as wind power, are very low and close to zero. Accordingly, 
we assume zero short run (operating) generation costs of green electricity generation. Hence, 
using the existing green generation capacity is costless; only additional green generation 
capacity and maintenance of capacity carry a cost. For the generation of black electricity, we 
assume that an abundant capacity exists at the outset, resulting in no need for capacity 
investments. This assumption is also made in Coulomb et al. (2019). An increasingly important 
concern in the decarbonization of the electricity sector is the intermittency of renewable sources 
of electricity. In this paper, we abstract from this concern and regard black and green electricity 
generation as perfect substitutes. For a treatment on the intermittency of renewables, we refer 
to other studies (Abrell et al., 2019; Ambec & Crampes, 2019; Helm & Mier, 2019; Hirth, 2015; 
Pommeret & Schubert, 2019). 
 




> 0 and 
∂2c
∂yt
2 ≥ 0. The capacity costs for green generation capacity, g(𝑧t̅) 
have increasing marginal costs and are convex as well, i.e., 
∂g
∂?̅?t
> 0 and 
∂2𝑔
∂?̅?t
2 ≥ 0. The physical 
investment in new generation capacity is denoted by k𝑡. We apply a multiplicative cost function 
for total green costs and denote this as g(𝑧t̅)𝑘𝑡e
−ρt. Since we are solving the model for 
investments in new green generation capacity, this depiction of the cost function has convenient 
properties. We allow for green technology costs to decrease over time with the rate 𝜌. This 
technological progress is exogenous9 and captures the considerable cost reductions in mature 
green technologies in recent years (notably for PV technologies10). The equation of motion for 
green generation capacity is: ż̅𝑡 = kt − κ𝑧?̅?. In our model, kt is the instrument variable, and 𝑧?̅? 
represents the state variable. The green generation capacity is assumed to depreciate at a rate of 
κ. For simplicity, we do not include depreciation of black electricity generation. Similar 
assumptions are made in Coram & Katzner (2018) and Neetzow (2019). 
 
 
9 We do not consider why green technology becomes cheaper over time since this is not of major relevance. This 
assumption is also made in Helm & Mier (2019) 
10 The price of solar PV modules has decreased approximately 80% from the end of 2009 through the end of 
2015. The costs are projected to decrease further, approximately 42% from 2015 to 2025 (IRENA, 2016) 
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3. Model applications  
3.1. Base scenario - no regulation 
In this scenario, no regulations are imposed on the generators. The optimization problem for 
the generators is to maximize the difference between the revenue from sale of electricity and 
the costs of electricity generation, subject to the equation of motion for the capacity of green 
electricity, and green generation at full capacity utilization until a terminating period denoted 













𝑧̅̇𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 − κ𝑧t̅  
𝑧𝑡 ≤ 𝑧?̅? 
 
The first constraint is the equation of motion for the capacity of green electricity generation. 
The second constraint denotes that green electricity generation takes place at full capacity 
utilization. This constraint is assumed binding. Denoting the costate variable by λt and the 
Lagrange multiplier ϑt, the corresponding present value Hamiltonian reads: 
 
Ht = [p(xt)xt − c(yt) − g(𝑧?̅?)e
−ρtkt]e
−rt + λt(kt − κ𝑧?̅? ) − 𝜗𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?) 
 




= [𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡)]𝑒
















−𝑟𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡𝜅 + 𝜗𝑡 = −?̇?𝑡 
(4)  
 𝜆𝑇 ≥ 0 (5)  
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 𝐻𝑇 = [𝑝(𝑥𝑇)𝑥𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑇) − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑇𝑘𝑇]𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 + 𝜆𝑇(𝑘𝑇 − κz̅T ) − 𝜗𝑇(𝑧𝑇
− 𝑧?̅?) = 0 
(6)  
 
By taking the derivative of (3) with respect to time and applying the equation of motion 
(𝑧̅̇𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 − κ𝑧t̅), we obtain: 
 
−[𝑔′(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡(𝑘𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?) − 𝜌𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡]𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟[𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡]𝑒−𝑟𝑡 = −λ̇𝑡 (7)  
 
Equalizing (7) with (4) and inserting (2), we derive the optimality condition for the price of 
electricity. Furthermore, from (1), the price of electricity must satisfy 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐




′(𝑦𝑡) =  [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 (8)  
 
The price of electricity equals the marginal costs of black electricity generation, which is again 
equal to the (annualized) marginal costs of green electricity generation. As shown in Appendix 
B, the electricity price will decrease over time together with increasing consumption of 
electricity. Furthermore, the generation of black electricity will decrease over time, whereas the 
generation of green electricity will increase with technological progress. The increasing 
generation of green electricity will more than outweigh the decreasing generation of black 
electricity. With no technological progress (ρ = 0), price, consumption and black and green 
electricity generation will be constant over time. 
 
Hence, even in the unregulated case, the generation of black electricity – and therefore 
emissions – will fall over time as investments in green generation capacity become cheaper. 
However, the reduction of emissions may fall short of the target, thus warranting additional 
regulation. 
 
3.2. Constrained social optimum 
We assume that the regulator has announced a specific target path for emission reductions. We 
do not explore the motivations behind the choice of the target path and simply propose that an 
emission target should be achieved in a cost-effective manner. For simplicity, we assume the 
following expression for the target path of emission reductions: ?̂?t = y0e
−χt, where χ is the 
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reduction rate desired by the regulator, and y0 is the initial level of black electricity generation. 
The binding target path of emission reductions gives rise to a specific investment profile in new 
green generation capacity. Henceforth, we refer to results attained in this section as solutions 













𝑧̅̇𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 − κ𝑧t̅  
𝑧𝑡 ≤ 𝑧?̅? 
𝑦𝑡 ≤ ?̂?t 
 
The first two constraints are the same as before. The third constraint expresses the emission 
reductions announced by the regulator. We assume that this constraint is binding, i.e., the 
generation of black electricity is always less than the generation of black electricity in the 
unregulated case. Hence, we obtain a positive shadow price of the emission constraint.  
 
Denoting the costate variable by βt, the Lagrange multiplier υt, and the shadow price of the 
generation constraint by ωt, the corresponding present value Hamiltonian reads: 
 
Ht = [p(xt)xt − c(yt) − g(𝑧?̅?)e
−ρtkt]e
−rt + βt(kt − κ𝑧?̅?) − υ𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?) − ωt(𝑦𝑡 − ŷt) 
 




= [pt − c
′(ŷt)]e




















 βT ≥ 0 (13)  
 HT = [p(xT)xT − c(𝑦T) − g(z̅T)e
−ρTkT]e
−rT + βT(kT − κz̅T) − υT(zT
− z̅T) + ωT(ŷT − yT) = 0 
(14)  
 
We take the time derivative of (11), equalize the expression with (12) and insert (10). We then 
obtain the following expression for the price of electricity: 
 




This expression is inserted into (9) to solve for the shadow price of the emission constraint: 
 
 𝜔𝑡 = [[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 − 𝑐′(?̂?t)]𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 (15)  
 
From (15), the shadow price equals the discounted difference between the (annualized) 
marginal costs of green electricity generation and the marginal generation costs of black 
electricity, with a binding emission constraint. If green electricity generation becomes cheaper 
over time through technological progress (ρ > 0), the shadow price decreases over time. Then, 
cheaper green electricity generation displaces the generation of black electricity at a lower cost.  
 
We obtain the optimality condition for the price of electricity by substituting the shadow price 
into (9): 
  
 𝑝𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 = 𝑐′(?̂?t) + 𝜔𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑡 (16)  
 
The price of electricity is equal to the (annualized) marginal costs of green electricity 
generation, which must equal the sum of the marginal generation costs of black electricity with 
the binding emission constraint and the shadow price of the emission constraint.  
 
As shown in Appendix C, the electricity price will increase over time in the absence of 
technological progress (ρ = 0). In this case, the generation of green electricity increases over 
time (with investments above depreciation), while black electricity generation decreases over 
time in accordance with the regulation. In sum, total electricity generation falls over time. 
However, in the case of technological progress, electricity price development is indeterminate. 
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With a price of electricity that decreases over time, the generation of green electricity must 
increase. A decreasing electricity price necessitates an increase in green electricity generation 
when the generation of black electricity is decreasing, and the demand function is assumed to 
be time invariant. Hence, the generation of green electricity in the social optimum increases 
over time irrespective of the degree of technological progress. 
 
We can now find the investment profile for new green generation capacity associated with the 
binding emission constraint. We take the time derivative of (16). Further, we apply the equation 
of motion, use the relationship, 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡, and solve for investments in new green generation 







(?̇̂?𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?) − [(𝑟 + 2𝜌 + 2𝜅)𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?) + (𝜅𝑧?̅?)















(?̇̂?𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?) is negative, since 
𝜕𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
< 0 and the target path ?̇̂?𝑡 is negative. In the second term, 
the content in the square bracket consists of only positive cost expressions of green electricity 
generation. With a negative sign in front of it, it becomes negative. The denominator is also 
negative since it consists of two negative terms: (
𝜕𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
) < 0 and −[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 2𝜅)𝑔′(𝑧?̅?) +
𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 < 0. Investments in new green generation capacity is therefore positive.  
 
3.3. The TGC scheme 
In this section, we analyze a TGC scheme such as the Nordic TGC scheme. Generators receive 
a TGC (𝑠𝑡) per unit of green electricity generated (𝑧𝑡) from the issuing body (the regulator) 
and sell these on the TGC market. Thus, the generators of green electricity obtain remuneration 
(the price of TGCs) on top of the wholesale price for electricity (i. e. , st + wt). The demand for 
TGCs arises in that electricity retailers and certain larger electricity customers have an 
obligation to buy TGCs corresponding to a given percentage as determined by the regulator 
(the percentage requirement, 𝛼𝑡) out of the total electricity delivered/consumed (αtxt). We do 
not include retailers and distributors of electricity since their role is strictly as intermediaries. 
The obligation is therefore imposed on the consumers. The end-user price of electricity is then 
determined by the wholesale price of electricity and the obligation to hold green TGCs. With 
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competitive markets, the equilibrium end-user price for electricity can be expressed as 
pt = wt + αtst. As the supply of certificates is equal to 𝑧𝑡 and the demand for certificates 
is αtxt, the equilibrium condition for the TGC market is simply: 𝑧𝑡 =  αtxt.  
 













𝑧?̇̅? = 𝑘𝑡 − κ𝑧?̅?   
𝑧𝑡 ≤ 𝑧?̅? 
 
Denoting the costate variable γt and the Lagrange multiplier φt, the corresponding present value 
Hamiltonian to this problem amounts to: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = [(𝑝𝑡 − 𝛼𝑡𝑠𝑡)𝑥𝑡 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑡) − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡𝑧𝑡]𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡(𝑘𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?) − φ𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?) 
 
The first-order conditions are: 12 
 𝜕𝐻𝑡
𝜕𝑦𝑡
= [𝑤𝑡 − 𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡)]𝑒




= (𝑤𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡)𝑒











−𝑟𝑡 − 𝛾𝑡𝜅 + φ𝑡 = −?̇?𝑡 
(21)  
 𝛾𝑇 ≥ 0 (22)  
 𝐻𝑇 = [(𝑝𝑇 − 𝛼𝑇𝑠𝑇)𝑥𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑇) − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑇𝑘𝑇 + 𝑠𝑇𝑧𝑇]𝑒
−𝑟𝑇




11 Observe that  αtstxt = 𝑠tzt 
12 The end-user price in equilibrium is given by: pt = wt + αtst 
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To derive an expression for the TGC price, we take the time derivative of (20), equalize it with 
(21) and insert (19). From (18), we observe that 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡).  We then obtain the following 
expression: 
 
 𝑠𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 − 𝑐′(𝑦𝑡) (24)  
 
The TGC price is the difference between the (annualized) marginal costs of green electricity 
generation and the marginal cost of black electricity generation. Hence, the objective of the 
TGC scheme is to promote the generation of green electricity by reducing the gap between the 
marginal costs of the two types of generation technologies. If green generation technology 
becomes cheaper  (ρ > 0), the gap and the TGC price decrease. 
 
To derive an expression for the end-user price of electricity, we observe from (18) that the 
wholesale price of electricity is equal to the marginal cost of black electricity generation, insert 
this relationship along with the TGC price from (24) into the expression for the end-user price 
pt = wt + αtst, and obtain: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡) (25)  
 
The end-user price of electricity is thus a weighted sum of the (annualized) marginal costs of 
green electricity generation and the marginal cost of black electricity generation, with the 
percentage requirement as the weight. The absence of a percentage requirement (α𝑡 = 0) 
implies no regulation, and the price of electricity is determined solely by the marginal costs of 
black electricity generation.  
 
Next, we seek to characterize the effects of a TGC scheme on the generation of black and green 
electricity. Hence, consider any (continuous and differentiable) time path of percentage 
requirements as announced by the regulator to be followed in the electricity market. 
Accordingly, take the total time derivative of (25), use the fact that 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧?̅? =
𝛼𝑡𝑦
1−𝛼𝑡
, and solve 






?̇?𝑡 [(1 − 𝛼𝑡)
2𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 (
𝜕𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡





2𝛼𝑡𝜌((𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?))𝑒
−𝜌𝑡




2[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 2𝜅)𝑔′(𝑧?̅?) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒





As shown in (26), the effect on black electricity generation (and emission) is not clear-cut. The 
denominator is negative since 0 < αt < 1, 
𝜕𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡
< 0, and the generation costs of electricity are 
positive. The numerator, on the other hand, is indeterminate. However, if we assume that green 
technology does not become cheaper over time (ρ = 0), then the last term of the numerator 
((1 − 𝛼𝑡)
2𝛼𝑡𝜌((𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?))𝑒
−𝜌𝑡) disappears. The expression inside the square 
bracket is positive; thus, if ρ = 0 and ?̇?𝑡 > 0, then ?̇?𝑡 is negative. In the TGC literature, using 
static models, an increase of the percentage requirement has been previously shown to have a 
strictly negative effect on black electricity generation (see e.g. Amundsen & Mortensen, 2001). 
This result carries over to the dynamic model. However, previous theoretical models have not 
included cost decreases in green electricity generation (ρ > 0). From (26) we see that the last 
term of the numerator is negative and works in the opposite direction to dampen the reduction 
in black electricity generation, and therefore also emission, when ρ > 0and ?̇?𝑡 > 0. 
 









2(1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝜌𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡
(1 − 𝛼𝑡) [
𝜕𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑥𝑡




Inspection of signs shows that the denominator of (27) is negative, while the numerator is 
indeterminate. The D -term in (27) is also indeterminate. Hence, the effect on green investment 
of an increasing path of percentage requirements is in general inconclusive. This holds even if 
green technology does not become cheaper over time (ρ = 0). However, as ρ takes on higher 
values, the second negative element in the numerator of (27) increases in strength and may turn 
the numerator strictly positive. Such an inconclusive effect has been remarked earlier in the 
theoretical literature. The point being that an increasing share of renewables could well be 
achieved solely through a reduction of black electricity (see e.g. Amundsen & Mortensen, 
 
13 The term D is written in its entirety in Appendix D. 
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2001). However, in a dynamic model with technological progress in green capacity generation, 
expansion of green electricity generation becomes more likely.   
 
In general, a TGC scheme gives rise to a subsidy of green electricity generation at the expense 
of black electricity generation. In some cases, the stimulus of green electricity may be so strong 
for example, due to technological progress in green electricity generation that it more than 
compensates for the declining generation of black electricity, thus giving rise to falling prices 
and increasing electricity consumption. A similar conclusion is found in Ambec & Crampes 
(2019). Along the same lines, Abrell et al. (2019) argue that a TGC scheme has insufficient 
incentives for energy conservation compared to the socially optimal outcome.  
 
4. Analyses and discussion 
4.1. The regulator´s choice of percentage requirements 
In this section, we examine whether a TGC scheme may be used to achieve the target path for 
emission reduction in an optimal manner, i.e., in accordance with the optimal social solution in 
section 3.2, which amounts to determining a time path of percentage requirements that the 
regulator should announce for the market to comply with. Here, we consider two candidates: a 
path of percentage requirements calculated from the optimal social solution and a path of 
percentage requirements specifically designed to attain the target path for the reduction of black 
electricity generation. 
 
A natural thought would be to use the values from the optimal social solution and calculate a 













∗ represent optimal social generation of green electricity and optimal total social 
generation of electricity, respectively. Hence, the regulator announces the exact same shares of 
green electricity as in the optimal social solution, with the percentage requirement, believing 
that this would result in the optimal social outcomes. 
 
We can characterize the time path emanating from (28), (e.g., whether it is increasing or 
decreasing). Note that 𝑥𝑡
∗ = 𝑧𝑡

















From Appendix C, we know that the social optimum is characterized by żt
∗ > 0 regardless of 
technological progress in green capacity construction. Hence, the first term of the numerator of 
(29) is positive. However, it is not necessarily the case that ẋt
∗(ẏ̂ + żt
∗) > 0 in the second term 
of the numerator. With no technological progress (ρ = 0), we must have ẋt
∗ < 0, which results 
in ṗt
∗ > 0 and α̇t > 0. However, in the case where green electricity generation capacity 
becomes cheaper (ρ > 0), we can have ẋt
∗ > 0 such that ṗt
∗ < 0. In this case, the time path of 
the percentage requirement is indeterminate.  
 
A comparison of the first-order conditions in (9) – (12) and (18) – (21) lead us to conclude that 
a TGC scheme based on the time path of percentage requirements calculated from (28) cannot 
achieve the  socially optimal social solution. Furthermore, a comparison of the optimality 
conditions for the electricity price in (16) and (25) shows that these can only be equal if 𝛼𝑡equals 
one. However, since 0 < 𝛼𝑡 < 1, this is not feasible.  
 
In fact, a TGC scheme using a time path of percentage requirements given in (28) will give rise 
to higher total electricity generation, higher black electricity generation and higher green 




?̂?𝑡, and  𝑧𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑧𝑡
∗, where the superscript, TGC, denotes the TGC solution. Since we obtain the 
result that 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑥𝑡
∗, we must then have 𝑝𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 < 𝑝𝑡
∗.  The main reason for the result that 𝑝𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 <
𝑝𝑡
∗, is simply that the generators of black electricity subsidize the production of green electricity 
so that the generation of green electricity is stimulated above what is socially optimal (𝑧𝑡
∗).  A 
formal proof is given in Appendix E. 
 
To enhance the understanding of this result, we apply an illustrative numerical model based on 






Figure 1: The use of a TGC scheme to achieve the announced target path of emission reductions 
when the time path of percentage requirements is calculated from (28) 
 
Figure 1 shows the announced target path (solid line) and the emission reductions obtained from 
using the TGC scheme (dashed line,). The figure also illustrates the effect of cheaper green 
technology with an increasing value of ρ. If the regulator uses the TGC scheme based on the 
shares of the social optimum as given in (28), emissions will be reduced, but the target path is 
not obtained. Figure 1 also shows that emissions will be insufficiently reduced even for higher 
levels of cost reductions in green technology. The chosen parameter values and functional forms 
determine the actual curvatures, but the numerical model highlights our theoretical findings that 
are also in line with previous findings in the literature. 
 
Hence, as concluded, the percentage requirement derived in (28) cannot be used successfully 
to simultaneously attain the outcomes from the social optimum. Thus, whether a TGC scheme 
can be used to achieve socially optimal values is uncertain. The aim is to characterize an 
alternative candidate for the regulator´s choice of a time path of percentage requirements, i.e., 
a path where a TGC scheme attains the target path for decreasing black electricity generation. 
Subsequently, we ask whether such a time path will also achieve the socially optimal solution 
45 
 
for green electricity generation. This solution is numerically determined, hence, we cannot 
provide analytical expressions for this time path. 
 
We calculate a time path of 𝛼𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶´s that, when applied in a TGC scheme, results in a path of 
green electricity that displaces black electricity exactly in accordance with the specific target 
path of black electricity, i.e., such that 𝑦𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 = ?̂?𝑡 at all dates. More precisely, we apply the 
optimality condition for the electricity price in (25), include the binding constraint 𝑦𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 = ?̂?𝑡, 





We can then solve for the path of the percentage requirements (𝛼𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶´s) that meets the 
announced target path explicitly. Clearly, this path cannot be identical to the path calculated 
from the shares of the optimal social solution as expressed in (28). 
 
Along with the development of black electricity generation, a corresponding development of 






Comparing this development with the development of green electricity generation in the 
optimal social solution, we find that the generation of green electricity for the case considered 
here is larger. Hence, a TGC scheme that achieves the target path of black electricity generation 
results in overinvestment in green generation capacity. As with the other version of the time 
path for the percentage requirement, we again obtain the result that  𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑥𝑡
∗, and hence, 
𝑝𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 < 𝑝𝑡
∗. A formal proof of this scenario is provided in Appendix H. 
 
4.2. Emission fee on black electricity generation 
In this section, we derive the outcomes when using an emission fee to achieve the announced 
target path of emission reductions. The fee (𝜏𝑡) is levied on generators of black electricity for 













𝑧̅̇𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?  
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𝑧𝑡 ≤ 𝑧?̅? 
 
Denoting the costate variable by εt and the Lagrange multiplier ςt, the present value Hamiltonian 
takes the following form: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = [𝑝(𝑥𝑡)𝑥𝑡 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑡) − 𝜏𝑡𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡𝑘𝑡]𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡(𝑘𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?) − ς𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?) 
 




= [𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡)−𝜏𝑡]𝑒
















−𝑟𝑡− 𝜖𝑡𝜅 + ς𝑡 = −𝜖?̇? 
(33)  
 𝜖𝑇 ≥ 0 (34)  
 𝐻𝑇 = [𝑝(𝑥𝑇)𝑥𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑇) − 𝜏𝑇𝑦𝑇 − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑇𝑘𝑇]𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 + 𝜖𝑇(𝑘𝑇 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?)
− ς𝑇(𝑧𝑇 − 𝑧?̅?) 
(35)  
 
By taking the time derivative of (32), equalizing it with (33) and inserting (31), we obtain the 
optimality condition for the price of electricity. Furthermore, from (30), we observe that 𝑝𝑡 =
𝑐′(𝑦𝑡)+𝜏𝑡. We then obtain the following result: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(z̅𝑡) +  𝜅z̅𝑡𝑔
′(z̅𝑡)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 = 𝑐′(𝑦𝑡)+𝜏𝑡 (36)  
 
The condition in (36) mirrors the result from the social optimum in (16). The price of electricity 
is determined by the (annualized) marginal costs of green electricity generation. To achieve the 
optimality outcome from (16), we derive an expression for the necessary emission fee. From 
(36), we obtain: 
 
 𝜏𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(z̅𝑡) +  𝜅z̅𝑡𝑔
′(z̅𝑡)]𝑒




The emission fee is the difference between the (annualized) marginal costs of green electricity 
generation and the marginal costs of black electricity generation. To obtain socially optimal 
results, the regulator must set the emission fee equal to the shadow price of the emission 
constraint (𝜔𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑡). As with the TGC price in (24), cheaper green technology reduces the size 
of the necessary emission fee. With the condition that 𝜏𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑡, the emission fee is an optimal 
policy instrument. The investment profile in new green generation capacity will then be equal 
to the solution in the social optimum derived in (17). 
 
4.3. Subsidy for green electricity generation 
Finally, we consider whether the regulator can use a subsidy for green electricity generation to 
achieve the announced target path. The subsidy (𝜎𝑡) is given per unit of output to generators of 













𝑧̅̇𝑡 = 𝑘𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?  
𝑧𝑡 ≤ 𝑧?̅? 
 
Denoting the costate variable by δt and the Lagrange multiplier νt, the present value Hamiltonian 
reads: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = [𝑝(𝑥𝑡)𝑥𝑡 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑡) − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑡𝑘𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡𝑧𝑡]𝑒
−𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡(𝑘𝑡 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?) − ν𝑡(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?) 
 




= [𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡)]𝑒




= [𝑝𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡] 𝑒













−𝑟𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡𝜅 + ν𝑡 = −?̇?𝑡 
(41)  
 𝛿𝑇 ≥ 0 (42)  
 𝐻𝑇 = [𝑝(𝑥𝑇)𝑥𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑇) − 𝑔(𝑧?̅?)𝑒
−𝜌𝑇𝑘𝑇 + 𝜎𝑇𝑧𝑇]𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 + 𝛿𝑇(𝑘𝑇 − 𝜅𝑧?̅?)
− ν𝑇(𝑧𝑇 − 𝑧?̅?) 
(43)  
 
By taking the time derivative of (40), equalizing it with (41) and inserting (39), we get the 
optimality condition for the price of electricity. We then obtain the following result: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 − 𝜎𝑡 (44)  
 
The price of electricity is equal to the difference between the (annualized) marginal costs of 
green electricity generation and the green subsidy. The expression for the subsidy is obtained 
by combining (38) and (44): 
 
 𝜎𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 − 𝑐′(𝑦𝑡) (45)  
 
By using (44) and (45), we can find that for the subsidy to be able to achieve the announced 
target path of emission reductions, we must have: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(?̅?𝑡) +  𝜅?̅?𝑡𝑔
′(?̅?𝑡)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡
− ([(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(?̅?𝑡) +  𝜅?̅?𝑡𝑔
′(?̅?𝑡)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 − 𝑐′(?̂?𝑡)) = 𝑐′(?̂?𝑡) 
(46)  
 
If the regulator uses a subsidy to attain the announced target path, the electricity price is equal 
to the marginal costs of black electricity generation, with the binding emission constraint 
(𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡). Comparing (46) and (16), the subsidy reduces the end-user price of electricity and 
increases the consumption of electricity. The subsidy, as the emission fee, is the difference 
between the (annualized) marginal costs of green and black electricity generation. They are, 
however, not equivalent in value. When an emission fee and a subsidy achieve the same 
emission reductions, the subsidy must be larger since it increases the consumption of electricity 
through a reduction in the price of electricity (Fischer & Newell, 2008). As with the emission 




The investment profile for new green generation capacity is obtained by taking the time 
derivative of (46) and using the equilibrium condition for the electricity market. We then obtain 

















Investments in new green generation capacity are positive and higher than the solution desired 
by the regulator, as mentioned earlier. Unlike the investment profiles for the TGC scheme and 
the emission fee, the investment profile in (47) is not affected by technological progress in green 
generation technology (𝜌). The reason is that the price of electricity is determined by the 
marginal costs of black electricity generation. 
 
4.4. Price paths of electricity and social surplus – a comparison of instruments 
A general expression for the price path of electricity when using a TGC scheme may be found 
by taking the time derivative of (25):  
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = ?̇?𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡((𝑟 + 𝜌 + 2𝜅)𝑔′(z̅𝑡) + 𝜅z̅𝑡𝑔
′′(z̅𝑡))𝑧̅̇𝑡𝑒
−𝜌𝑡
− 𝛼𝑡𝜌((𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(z̅𝑡) +  𝜅z̅𝑡𝑔
′(z̅𝑡))𝑒




The general result is that the price path is indeterminate even if we assume no cost reductions 
in green technology (𝜌 = 0). The challenge faced by the regulator is to find a time path of 
percentage requirements that may achieve the socially optimal solution when using a TGC 
scheme. From section 4.1, we know that the TGC scheme with a time path of percentage 
requirements based on (28) is unable to achieve the emission reductions and investments in new 
green generation capacity desired by the regulator. Hence, for a TGC scheme to meet the 
emission constraints, the regulator must calculate a time path of percentage requirements that 
achieves the announced target path exactly. From the analysis, we know that even for this case, 
the development of the price path of electricity is indeterminate. This version of the time path 




The price path of electricity when using the emission fee is obtained by taking the time 
derivative of (36): 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = (((𝑟 + 𝜌 + 2𝜅)𝑔′(z̅𝑡) + 𝜅z̅𝑡𝑔
′′(z̅𝑡))ż̅𝑡 − 𝜌((𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(z̅𝑡) +  𝜅z̅𝑡𝑔
′(z̅𝑡))) 𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 (49)  
 
From (49), we can see that even if an expansion of green generation capacity occurs (ż̅𝑡 > 0), 
the price path is ambiguous due to cost reductions in green technology. However, if we assume 
that 𝜌 = 0, then the price of electricity is monotonically increasing. We illustrate this path using 
the numerical model in Figure 2. 
 
We showed that the price of electricity when using the subsidy is equal to the marginal costs of 
black electricity generation, with the binding emission constraint. The price path is obtained by 
taking the time derivative of (46): 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = 𝑐
′′(?̂?𝑡)?̇̂?𝑡 (50)  
 
Since the announced target path is negative, we know that the price of electricity using the 
subsidy is decreasing and that the path is unaffected by an increase in 𝜌. 
 
Figure 2 displays the price path of electricity for the different instruments, with different values 
for 𝜌.14. The emission fee is the solid line, and the dashed dotted line represents the subsidy. 
The dashed line is the TGC scheme where the time path of the percentage requirement is derived 
from (28) (denoted TGC (z/x)), and the round dotted line represents the TGC scheme where the 




14 The results in this paper rest on the premise that the demand for electricity is time invariant. However, good 
reasons to expect that the demand for electricity will change over time may exist, which we explore by assuming 
that a drift in demand over time. We show that the general results of the paper still hold. The results are 





Figure 2: The price path of electricity for the different instruments 
 
From Figure 2, we can see that cheaper green technology has an impact on the price path of 
electricity for all the instruments, except the subsidy. As shown in (46), the price of electricity 
when using the subsidy is determined by the marginal costs of black electricity generation. 
Hence, cheaper green technology does not affect the price path. Use of the subsidy also results 
in the lowest price and thus excessive demand for electricity. On the other hand, the emission 
fee produces the highest price of electricity. The illustrations in Figure 2 also clarify the 
ambiguity of the price path from (49). As green generation technology becomes cheaper, the 
price of electricity stops increasing, and the price path eventually starts falling. This is a 
reasonable result since the price of electricity is determined by the (annualized) marginal 
generation costs of green electricity. 
 
Regardless of the calculation of the time path of the percentage requirements, the use of a 
TGC scheme results in a lower price of electricity than the socially optimal price attained with 
the emission fee. The price paths with both percentage requirements, however, are similar to 
the path resulting from the emission fee. With the TGC scheme, the price of electricity is the 
weighted sum of the (annualized) marginal costs of green electricity generation and the 
marginal cost of black electricity generation, with the percentage requirement as the weight.  
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Cheaper green technology therefore reduces the price of electricity but less than by using the 
emission fee. We can therefore see that the price paths with the emission fee and the TGC 
scheme start to converge for higher values of 𝜌. The illustrations in Figure 2 also show that 
out of the two versions of the time path of the percentage requirements, the price of electricity 
is highest when the time path of the percentage requirement is calibrated to achieve the target 
path exactly. In this case, there will be overinvestment in new green generation capacity. If 
the time path of the percentage requirement is derived from (28) instead, we know that not 
only will there be overinvestment in new green generation capacity, but generation of black 
electricity will be higher than the target path as well. 
 
Next, we construct a ranking of the economic efficiency of the instruments in terms of social 
surpluses. For the TGC scheme, only one of the versions of the percentage requirement obtains 
the announced target path of emission reductions. This is the version where the time path of 
percentage requirements is calibrated to achieve the target path exactly. We will focus on this 
version and compare it with the emission fee and the subsidy. 
 
For the emission fee, we have the following expression for the social surplus: 
 














We know that if the emission fee is set equal to the shadow price of the emission constraint, it 
achieves the solutions of the social optimum, denoted by y𝑡
∗ = ?̂?𝑡, z̅𝑡
∗ and x𝑡
∗. The symbol lτ is 
an expression of the lump sum present value of the total emission fee subtracted from the 




). This amount must be added when calculating the social 



















With the subsidy, the superscript 𝜎 denotes the values of the variables when the subsidy is used. 
The expression for the social surplus when using the subsidy reads: 
 











𝑑𝑡 − 𝑙𝜎 
 




added from outside the 
electricity sector. We must subtract this amount when calculating the social surplus. We can 
then rewrite the social surplus when using a subsidy as: 
 
 
















If we compare the optimality condition for the subsidy in (46) with the optimal outcome for the 







𝑟𝑡. Using a subsidy to 
achieve the target path of emission reductions results in excessive investments in new green 
generation capacity. The social surplus is maximized if 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡





With the TGC scheme, we discuss the version where the percentage requirement is calibrated 
to achieve the announced target path exactly (𝑦𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡). Since the TGC scheme is a self-
contained system, we do not have to add or subtract anything to calculate the social surplus. 
The expression for the social surplus can then be written as: 
 
















We show in Appendix H that when the TGC scheme achieves the target path of emission 




∗ (which also entails 𝑘𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶(?̂?)
> 𝑘𝑡
∗). Since we 
have that 𝑧𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 = 𝛼𝑡𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶  and ?̂?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑡)𝑥𝑡


































] 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 𝑑𝑡 
(53)  
 
The social surplus is maximized when 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
∗. Hence, since 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑥𝑡
∗, 𝑊𝜏 > 𝑊𝑇𝐺𝐶(?̂?). 
 
We now finalize the ranking of the instruments by comparing the TGC scheme and the subsidy. 
We can compare the optimality conditions for the TGC scheme (when the target path of 
emission reductions is attained) and the subsidy from (25) and (46).  
 
We have that p(𝑥𝑡
𝜎) = c′(?̂?𝑡), and p (𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶(?̂?)
) = 𝛼𝑡[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 +
(1 − 𝛼𝑡)c′(?̂?𝑡). Since both instruments achieve the target path of emission reductions, the level 
of black electricity generation is the same for both instruments in every period. Further,   
[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒







< 0, we must have that 𝑥𝑡
𝜎 > 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶(?̂?)
, and hence, 𝑊𝑇𝐺𝐶(?̂?) > 𝑊𝜎. 
 
To summarize, when the regulator wants to achieve a specific target path of emission 
reductions, we obtain the following ranking of social surplus for the different instruments:  
 
 𝑊𝜏 > 𝑊𝑇𝐺𝐶(?̂?) > 𝑊𝜎 (54)  
 
While both the TGC scheme and the subsidy achieve the target path by crowding out the 
generation of black electricity, they provide insufficient incentives for energy conservation. 
Hence, the consumption of electricity increases through lower electricity prices. With the 
emission fee, better incentives for energy conservation exist, and the target path is achieved 





5. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we consider the problem of regulation of negative externalities in the form of 
GHG emissions. We explore the effectiveness of using a TGC scheme to achieve a specific 
target path of emission reductions in the electricity sector. The results are compared with the 
outcomes from using an emission fee and a green subsidy.  
 
If the regulator uses a TGC scheme and derives the time path of the percentage requirement 
from the socially optimal target share of green electricity, the generation of black electricity is 
reduced but not in accordance with the announced target path. In fact, the TGC scheme results 
in an overinvestment in new green generation capacity, an insufficient reduction of black 
electricity generation, and thus emissions. An alternative strategy to determine a time path of 
percentage requirements would be to calculate the percentage requirements that exactly attain 
the target path for black electricity and then announce this to the participants in the electricity 
market. We show that such a path of percentage requirements exists, but that this would still 
result in an overinvestment in green capacity compared with the optimal social solution. 
Regardless of the time path chosen for the percentage requirements, total electricity generation 
exceeds the socially optimal level; thus, the price of electricity will be too low. 
 
The optimal instrument to use is a path of emission fees where the fee at all dates is set equal 
to the shadow price of the emission constraint. The price of electricity is determined by the 
(annualized) marginal costs of green electricity generation. If green generation technology 
becomes cheaper over time, the price of electricity no longer increases monotonically, and the 
price path may eventually fall. This effect is also present for the price path of electricity when 
using a TGC scheme, but the effect is less pronounced due to the presence of the percentage 
requirement. We also derive the necessary conditions for a subsidy to achieve the announced 
target path. The subsidy lowers the price of electricity down to the marginal cost of black 
electricity generation, with the binding emission constraint. Hence, the resulting consumption 
of electricity is excessive. Since generation costs for black electricity determine the price of 
electricity, the price path is not affected by cheaper green generation technology. A comparison 
of the resulting social surplus shows that the maximum social surplus is attained by using a time 





Our results affirm that an optimal emission fee is a cost-effective strategy to manage negative 
externalities (Baumol & Oates, 1988). In practice, however, this option might not be available 
(Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006; Rivlin, 1989). For example, the EU explored 
the possibility of a tax, but eventually ended up introducing an emission trading scheme 
(Convery, 2009). Further, even if an emission fee is implemented, it is not necessarily set at an 
efficient level (Johnson, 2007). 
 
The use of a TGC scheme reduces emissions from fossil-based electricity generation for any 
time path of the percentage requirements chosen. With a properly calibrated percentage 
requirement, it can also achieve a specific reduction of emission over time such as the target for 
the reduction of black electricity generation. A TGC scheme is a self-contained subsidy system 
for the electricity sector where the government only announces a binding path of percentage 
requirements without being directly involved in funding. Generators of green electricity receive 
green certificates in proportion to the amount of electricity generated, while end-users of 
electricity are requested to buy the certificates and thereby provide funding for the TGC 
scheme. A TGC scheme with allocation of certificates is similar to using an emission trading 
scheme with free allocation of permits. This allocation method has been cited as a reason for 
the political acceptability of emission trading systems (Harstad & Eskeland, 2010; Stavins, 
1998). Apart from reducing emissions, a TGC scheme is also designed to provide incentives 
for construction of new green generation capacity, which is not only an important step towards 
decarbonization of the electricity sector but can also release positive externalities related to 
technological innovation (learning by doing and spill-over effects). This may also be a reason 
for choosing support schemes for renewables over pricing instruments (Acemoglu, Aghion, 
Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012; Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). Further, promotion of electricity 
from renewables can also be motivated by concerns such as energy security and the creation of 
green jobs (Fischer & Preonas, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, while a TGC scheme can be used to reduce emissions, it is not necessarily 
a very accurate instrument. In terms of cost-effectiveness, a TGC performs better than a subsidy 
and, as mentioned, is a self-contained subsidy system where the funding is passed on to the 
consumers of electricity. Hence, unlike emission fees and auctioned emission permits, a TGC 
scheme does not raise any revenue. A revenue-raising instrument has the advantage that the 
collected revenue can be used to offset distorting taxes (Goulder, Parry, Williams III, & 
Burtraw, 1999). Finally, additional motivations for choosing a support scheme for renewables 
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over pricing instruments may exist, but not all concerns are equally valid. A technology-neutral 
TGC scheme favors the most mature technologies (Unger & Ahlgren, 2005), which does not 
necessarily entail promotion of technological innovation. This may be achieved through 
differentiation of technologies, where less mature technologies receive more TGCs per MWh 
generated (Woodman & Mitchell, 2011). Finally, even if energy security is used as justification 
for promoting construction of new green generation capacity, a high share of renewables is not 
necessarily an obvious solution (Löschel, Moslener, & Rübbelke, 2010). 
 
Our findings show that a TGC scheme can be used as an instrument to reduce emissions from 
the electricity sector. It can also be calibrated to achieve a specific path of emission reductions. 
However, the incentives for investment in new green generation capacity will be nonoptimal. 
Further, insufficient incentives for energy conservation will result in a higher demand for 
electricity compared to the use of direct emission pricing. A TGC scheme is designed to 
incentivize more construction of green generation capacity, but whether it is the best solution 
if promotion of technological innovation is an important objective is uncertain. Compared to an 
optimal emission fee, a TGC scheme is less cost-effective. Additionally, it does not generate 
revenue for the government. Nevertheless, a TGC scheme is more cost-effective than a green 
subsidy and results in less welfare loss. Thus, if effective pricing instruments are unavailable, 



















A. Functional forms and notations used in the model. 
Symbol Description 
pt End-user price of electricity at date t 
𝑤t Wholesale price of electricity at date t 
yt Generation of black electricity at date t 
ŷt Target level of black electricity generation at date t, announced by the regulator 
𝑧t Generation of green electricity at date t 
𝑧t̅ Green generation capacity at date t 
xt Consumption of electricity at date t 
kt Investment in new green generation capacity at date t, with kt ≥ 0  
st TGC price at date t 
αt Percentage requirement at date t 
τt Emission fee at date t 
σt Subsidy at date t 
r Social discount rate 
Ρ The rate of technological change for green generation technology 
κ Depreciation rate of green generation capacity 
χ The rate of decrease in emissions announced by the regulator 
T Termination date of the problem considered 
 
B. Proof of the price evolution of electricity from section 3.1. 
In the case with no regulations and technological progress in green generation technology 
(𝜌 > 0), the price of electricity decreases over time. The price decrease results from a decrease 
in the generation of black electricity and an increase in green generation capacity, where the 
latter will dominate. 
 
The optimality condition without regulation reads: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑐
′(𝑦𝑡) =  [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 B.I.  
 





Take the time derivative of B.I. to obtain: 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = 𝑐
′′(𝑦𝑡)?̇?𝑡 B.II.  
 
If ?̇?𝑡 ≥ 0, then ?̇?𝑡 ≥ 0 since 𝑐
′′(𝑦𝑡) ≥ 0. 
 
Further, from B.I., we must have: 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = −𝜌[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′(𝑧?̅?)]𝑒
−𝜌𝑡
+ [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔′(𝑧?̅?) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔′




If ?̇?𝑡 ≥ 0, then from B.III, 𝑧̅̇𝑡 > 0 since 𝑔′(𝑧?̅?) and 𝑔′′(𝑧?̅?) > 0.  
 
However, if ?̇?𝑡 ≥ 0 and ?̇?𝑡15 > 0, then ?̇?𝑡 > 0 such that ?̇?𝑡 < 0, which contradicts the 
assumption that ?̇?𝑡 ≥ 0. Therefore, we must have ?̇?𝑡 < 0 as we set out to show. ∎ 
 
C. Proof of the price evolution of electricity from section 3.2. 
In the case where the regulator has announced a target path of emission reductions (which is 
assumed to be binding), denoting the outcomes of this constrained social optimum by 𝑦𝑡
∗ = ?̂?𝑡, 
𝑧?̅?
∗, 𝑥𝑡
∗, the optimality condition states:  
 
 𝑝𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗)]𝑒−𝜌𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐′(?̂?𝑡) C.I.  
 
ρ = 0 
With depreciation of green generation capacity (κ > 0) and no technological progress for green 
generation technology (ρ = 0), we claim that ?̇?𝑡 > 0. 
 
We take the time derivative of C.I. to obtain: 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = [(𝑟 + 2𝜅)𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?𝑔
′′(𝑧?̅?
∗) ]𝑧̅̇𝑡
∗ C.II.  
 
 
15 Recall that we always have 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧?̅? 
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Then, from C.II., sign ?̇?𝑡 = sign 𝑧̅̇𝑡
∗ since 𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗) and 𝑔′′(𝑧?̅?
∗) > 0. 
 
Taking the time derivative of the other optimality condition in C.I., we obtain: 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = [𝑟𝜔𝑡 + ?̇?𝑡]𝑒
𝑟𝑡 + 𝑐′′(?̂?𝑡)?̇̂?𝑡 C.III.  
 
We know that the announced target path set by the regulator is characterized by ?̇̂?𝑡 < 0. 
 
To obtain a proof through contradiction, assume that ?̇?𝑡 ≤ 0, which leads to 𝑧̅̇𝑡
∗ ≤ 0. Since ?̇̂?𝑡 <
0, we have (?̇̂?𝑡 + ?̇?𝑡
∗) = ?̇?𝑡 < 0 such that ?̇?𝑡 > 0, which contradicts the assumption that ?̇?𝑡 ≤ 0.  
 
Therefore, we must have ?̇̂?𝑡 < 0, ?̇?𝑡
∗ > 0 and (?̇̂?𝑡 + ?̇?𝑡
∗) = ?̇?𝑡 < 0, resulting in ?̇?𝑡 > 0, which 
we set out to prove. 
 
ρ > 0 
In the case with technological progress for green generation technology (ρ > 0), ?̇?𝑡 will be 
indeterminate. 
 
The time derivative of C.I. then provides the following: 
 
 ?̇?𝑡 = −𝜌[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗)]𝑒−𝜌𝑡
+ [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 2𝜅)𝑔′(𝑧?̅?






Thus, the equality sign ?̇?𝑡 = sign 𝑧̅̇𝑡
∗ no longer holds with certainty. As a result, ?̇?𝑡 is 
indeterminate. ∎ 
 




















2[(r + ρ + 2κ)g′(z̅t) + κz̅tg
′′(z̅t)]e

















− αt[(r + ρ + 2κ)g′(z̅t) + κz̅tg′′(z̅t)]e−ρt) [
∂pt
∂xt





E. Proof of 𝒙𝒕
𝑻𝑮𝑪 > 𝒙𝒕
∗, 𝒚𝒕
𝑻𝑮𝑪 > ?̂?𝒕,  𝒛𝒕
𝑻𝑮𝑪 > 𝒛𝒕
∗ when 𝜶𝒕 = 𝜶𝒕
∗ 
Denote the outcomes of the constrained social optimum by 𝑦𝑡
∗ = ?̂?𝑡, 𝑧?̅?
∗, 𝑥𝑡
∗, and the outcomes 
of the TGC scheme by 𝑦𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶, 𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶 and 𝑥𝑡





∗) and observe that ?̂?𝑡 = (1 −
𝛼𝑡
∗)𝑥𝑡




∗. Observe further that 𝑦𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 = (1 − 𝛼𝑡
∗)𝑥𝑡





𝑇𝐺𝐶  due to the design of the TGC scheme. Hence, if 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑥𝑡
∗, then 𝑦𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > ?̂?𝑡, 
and  𝑧𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑧𝑡
∗. We show this by a proof of contradiction, i.e., we assume that 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
∗ and 




∗) = [(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗)]𝑒−𝜌𝑡 = 𝑐′(?̂?𝑡) + 𝜔𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑡   
 




∗[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗)]𝑒−𝜌𝑡









∗[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(?̅?𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 ) + 𝜅?̅?𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 𝑔′(?̅?𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 )]𝑒−𝜌𝑡












< 0. From E.I. and 




∗[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?







∗[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶  ) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶𝑔′(𝑧?̅?





However, this obviously cannot be the case since the assumption 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 ≤ 𝑥𝑡








𝑇𝐺𝐶 = (1 − 𝛼𝑡
∗)𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 ≤ ?̂?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑡
∗)𝑥𝑡
∗, 𝑔(𝑧?̅?) > 0, 
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𝑔′(𝑧?̅?) > 0 and 𝜔𝑡 > 0. Hence, we must have: 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑥𝑡
∗,, 𝑦𝑡





∗ when 𝛼𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡
∗. 16∎ 
 
F. Functional forms and parameter values used in the illustrative numerical model 
 














a, b, m, and n are all strictly positive constants with values of a: 340, b: 20, m: 57, and n: 47. 
Further, we set the social discount rate and the depreciation rate of the existing green generation 
capacity to 0.05 (r = κ = 0.05). Finally, the desired rate of emission reductions announced by 
the regulator is also set to 0.05 (χ = 0.05). 
 
G. The price path of electricity with the inclusion of drift in the demand over time 
To control for the scenario where drift exists in the demand for electricity over time, we 
construct a new function for the demand for electricity, pt
N = p(xt)e
−ηt. With a linear 
demand function, we can find numerical solutions with the expression 𝑝𝑡 = (𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝑡)e
ηt. 
The parameter η is an expression of positive drift in demand due to, e.g., electrification of the 
transport sector. 
 
We show that the general results of the paper still hold when controlling for drift in electricity 
demand over time. We perform the simulation with a value of 0.03 for η. The first-order 
conditions are the same, and the optimality results are therefore unchanged. Of course, 
differences in the values will exist; a higher demand over time will result in both a higher 
price and higher levels of new green generation capacity (the target path of emission 
reductions will still be met). The results are also robust for a negative value of η. A negative 




16 This proof is a generalization of a proof in Amundsen, Andersen and Mortensen (2018) for a static case. 
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The inclusion of positive drift in demand is illustrated in Figure G.1. The price path of electricity 
without drift is the solid line, while the dotted line shows the price path with drift. As we can 
see, even with the inclusion of drift, the trajectories for the two price paths are qualitatively 
similar and differ only with respect to the included drift, and as the price increases, the two 




Figure G.1: The price of electricity – socially optimal solutions with and without drift 
 
H. Proof of ?̅?𝒕




𝑻𝑮𝑪 = ?̂?𝒕 
In this case, the percentage requirement, 𝛼𝑡, is determined such that the target path of black 
electricity is attained at all dates. Using the same notation as in Appendix E, we know that 
𝑧𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 = 𝛼𝑡𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 and that ?̂?𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑡)𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 . Next, as in Appendix E, we rewrite the optimality 




∗) = 𝛼𝑡[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
∗)]𝑒−𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑐
′(?̂?𝑡) + 𝜔𝑡𝑒
𝑟𝑡)  H.I.  
 





𝑇𝐺𝐶) = 𝛼𝑡[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(?̅?𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 ) + 𝜅?̅?𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 𝑔′(?̅?𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 )]𝑒−𝜌𝑡




Clearly, the conditions G.I. and G.II., as well as the solutions, are not generally identical. We 
set out to prove that 𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶  > 𝑧?̅?
∗ and 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 > 𝑥𝑡
∗. Therefore, we apply a proof by contradiction. 
Hence, we assume the opposite, i.e., 𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶  ≤ 𝑧?̅?
∗ and 𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶 ≤ 𝑥𝑡
∗, and show that this leads to a 






Hence, we must have: 
 
 𝑝𝑡(𝑥𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝐶) = 𝛼𝑡[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶) + 𝜅𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶𝑔′(𝑧?̅?
𝑇𝐺𝐶)]𝑒−𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)𝑐
′(?̂?𝑡) ≥ 𝑝𝑡(𝑥𝑡
∗)
= 𝛼𝑡[(𝑟 + 𝜌 + 𝜅)𝑔(𝑧?̅?
∗) +  𝜅𝑧?̅?
∗𝑔′(𝑧?̅?









∗ and that 𝑔(𝑧?̅?) > 0, 𝑔′(𝑧?̅?) > 0 and 𝜔𝑡 >
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In this paper, we investigate whether a refunded emission payments (REP) scheme can cost-
effectively achieve a specific target path of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emission reductions. We 
examine two REP schemes and analyze their incentives for emission mitigation of energy-
producing firms. Firms can reduce their emissions through production cuts or investments in 
abatement technology. In the first scheme, firms pay a charge per unit of NOx emission and 
receive refunds based on their emission cuts. In the second, refunds are given in proportion to 
energy produced. The paper contributes to the REP literature by deriving analytical results for 
a cost-effective REP scheme. Further, we use a dynamic model to analyze the REP schemes. 
This allows us to examine time paths for the economic instruments and the mitigation incentives 
they provide. Finally, we examine heterogeneous firms' behavior under the two REP schemes 
and study their distributional outcomes. Both REP schemes can achieve the emission target. 
However, it is only cost-effective when all emission cuts are eligible for refunds. The choice of 
refund also affects the distributional outcome for different firm types. Our results suggest that 











1 The paper benefitted from presentation at the Danish Environmental Economic Conference 2020 and 
comments and suggestions from Eirik S. Amundsen and Frode Meland. The usual disclaimer applies. 




Nitrogen oxides (NOx), which consist of nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), are 
potent greenhouse gases that are also able to cause considerable local damage. The main source 
of NOx emissions is the combustion of fossil fuels. These emissions lead to acid deposition and 
eutrophication, causing detrimental effects on both soil and water quality. NOx (in the form of 
NO2) can also have significant adverse impacts on human health. High concentrations 
contribute to local air pollutants' formation and lead to inflammation of the airways (European 
Environment Agency, 2018). Negative externalities like pollution can be internalized with 
corrective instruments, such as Pigouvian taxes (Baumol & Oates, 1988). In practice, political 
constraints can restrict the instrument choice of regulators3. 
 
With a refunded emission payments (REP) scheme, a charge is put on the regulated firms' 
emissions, and the revenues are recycled back to the firms. Currently, there is limited 
experience with the use of REP schemes. Perhaps the most well-known example is Sweden, 
which introduced a REP scheme in 1992. A charge is levied per kilogram of NOx emitted, and 
the collected funds are recycled back to the same firms in proportion to their output of useful 
energy4 (Sterner & Isaksson, 2006). France operated with a similar system where the revenues 
were recycled back to firms as subsidies for abatement measures (Millock, Nauges, & Sterner, 
2004). In 2008, Norway introduced a voluntary solution called the NOx fund. The participating 
business organizations pay a charge upfront to the fund per kilogram of NOx emitted. These 
revenues are then recycled back based on verified emission cuts (NOx-fondet, 2019). 
 
In this paper, we investigate the regulation of negative externalities, where the regulator wants 
to achieve a specific target path of NOx emission reductions. However, due to political 
constraints, a first best Pigouvian tax is not available. Hence, the regulator tries to achieve cost-
effective regulation with the use of a REP scheme. Since the presence of constraints on 
regulation is not uncommon, it is an interesting analysis whether a REP scheme can act as a 
cost-effective instrument for reducing NOx emissions. 
 
 
3See Amundsen, Hansen, & Whitta-Jacobsen (2018)  for an analysis of indirect regulation of location-specific 
externalities from small-time polluters. 
4 “Useful energy” is generally accepted as a benchmark for measuring output for industries as varied as those 
regulated under the Swedish REP scheme, since the primary goal of the scheme is to affect the combustion 
technologies. Useful energy for power plants and district heating plants equals the energy sold. For other 
industries, useful energy is comprised of hot water, steam or electricity produced in the boiler, used in heating or 
factory buildings or the production process (Sterner & Isaksson, 2006). 
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The firms studied in the model produce energy that causes NOx emissions, and they can invest 
in new abatement technology. Hence, firms can reduce emissions through production cuts or 
by investing in new abatement capacity. We examine two different designs of a REP scheme. 
First, we look at a scheme where firms pay a charge per unit of emissions and receive refunds 
based on emissions cuts. This scheme is based on the scheme currently in use in Norway. The 
second is an output-based scheme, where firms pay a charge per unit of emissions and receive 
refunds in proportion to their output. This version is based on the system in place in Sweden 
and has a prominent place in the REP literature. We study the effects of the two REP schemes 
on output and investment incentives in new abatement technology. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the use of REP schemes using a dynamic model. 
Using a dynamic model allows us to analyze time-related issues such as time paths for economic 
instruments, paths for emission reductions, and investment profiles for abatement technology. 
Further, our model assumes heterogeneous firms. We can then examine the effects of the two 
REP schemes on different firm types, given an exogenous emission target. Finally, since REP 
schemes are more recent additions as environmental policy, it is interesting to assess their 
potential and limitations as an alternative to a Pigouvian tax. 
 
A key assumption in the paper is that the regulator announces a target path of NOx emission 
reductions that must be achieved using a REP scheme. It is not an assertion that the announced 
target path is the optimal solution for mitigating NOx emissions. We do not discuss the 
justification for this target path but merely assume that the regulator has announced it and that 
it is binding. The objective for the regulator in this paper is comparable to other established 
dynamic emission targets. For example, the emission target for CO2 in the European Union 
(EU) is determined by the total emission cap, which is reduced by an annual percentage 
reduction. This increasingly stringent and binding cap raises the price of emission permits and 
reduces CO2 emissions to achieve the EU's long-term target. The Gothenburg Protocol 
establishes commitments for, among other things, the reduction of NOx emissions, where final 
targets are set for the signatory countries. Furthermore, countries such as Norway have set 
commitments to ensure that the total NOx emissions over periods of two years do not exceed 
specified emission ceilings that decrease over time (NHO, 2020). In our model, we capture the 
cost of NOx emissions' negative external effects by the shadow price of the emission constraint. 
The emissions in our model are a function of the output of firms, as in Gersbach & Requate 




Analyses of exogenous emission targets' achievement are common in the environmental 
economics literature (Fell & Linn, 2013; Goulder & Parry, 2008; Wibulpolprasert, 2016). In 
the REP literature, the focus has been mainly on using REP schemes to reduce emissions. 
Sterner & Isaksson (2006) discuss the theory of an output-based REP scheme and the Swedish 
experience from using this instrument. Gersbach and Requate (2004) showed that refunding 
based on market shares under perfect competition causes distortions since output levels become 
excessive. Under imperfect competition, however, a combination of an emission tax and an 
output subsidy could result in the first-best outcome. This result was confirmed by Fischer 
(2011), who also showed that with imperfect competition and endogenous refunds, significant 
market shares could result in reduced abatement incentives. Further, in an asymmetric Cournot 
duopoly, endogenous refunds could result in too high output and emission levels. Hagem et al. 
(2015) used a static model to compare two REP schemes under perfect competition, where 
refunds are given in proportion to output and as a share of expenditures for abatement 
equipment. They found that both schemes result in cost-ineffective abatement compared to a 
Pigouvian tax. Bontems (2019) combined both output- and expenditure-based refunding. He 
showed that this combination could remedy REP schemes' drawbacks where refunds are given 
for either output or abatement equipment. 
 
Using econometric methods, other contributions have focused on the effect of REP schemes on 
the adoption of abatement technologies. Sterner & Turnheim (2009) studied the development 
of technical change for NOx abatement from large stationary sources in Sweden. They found 
that an output-based REP scheme was important in reducing emission intensities. Furthermore, 
Bonilla et al. (2015) found that the REP scheme in Sweden  had a positive effect on adopting 
post combustion technologies to mitigate NOx emissions. On the other hand, Coria and Mohlin 
(2017) argued that it is not unambiguous whether a REP scheme provided better incentives than 
a standard emission tax for technological upgrades over time. The effect of the refund 
diminishes as the regulated sector becomes cleaner. 
 
Our paper contributes to the REP literature in several ways. First, we examine whether a REP 
scheme can be an effective instrument for reducing NOx emissions, and we derive and discuss 
the necessary conditions for this to be the case in competitive markets. These results are 
compared with outcomes from using an output-based REP scheme. Second, we use a dynamic 
model in our analysis. This allows us to investigate how a dynamic emission target can be 
achieved and how output, investments in new abatement technology, and economic instruments 
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evolve over time. Third, the use of heterogeneous firms in a dynamic model allows us to explore 
how different firm types behave under different REP schemes for the same emission target. 
These results are highlighted using an illustrative numerical model. We are also able to compare 
the distributional effect for different firms with the two instruments. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical model and its 
assumptions are introduced. Section 3 begins by deriving the solutions to the problem of the 
regulator. Next, we derive the results from the two REP schemes and discuss their implications. 
The analysis is extended in section 4, where we conduct comparative statics to study different 
firms' behavior under the two REP schemes. Where appropriate, an illustrative numerical model 
is used to highlight the results. Further, we look at the distributional effect for different firms 
in terms of net payments. The paper is summarized, and concluding remarks are delivered in 
section 5. 
 
2. The model5 
The objective of the regulator is to reduce NOx emissions in accordance with an announced 
target path. This can be expressed as Mt = ∑ mit
n
i=1 ≤ M̅t = M̅0e
−ωt, where miois firm i's (i=1, 
…, n) initial emission level and ω is the rate of emission reductions the regulator wants to 
achieve. The model focuses on energy-producing firms that emit NOx as part of their production 
process. Firms are heterogeneous, and we assume competitive markets. There are N profit-
maximizing firms, and they take output prices and the actions of the other firms as given. We 
analyze an arbitrarily chosen firm. Production costs are integrated into a concave profit 
function, πi(qit). The capacity costs for abatement technology are denoted as hi(Kit), where 
Kit is the capacity of abatement technology for firm i. The function is increasing and convex in 
the capacity level of abatement technology, i.e., 
∂h𝑖
∂Kit
> 0 and 
∂2h𝑖
∂Kit
2 ≥ 0. Investment in new 
abatement technology is denoted by k𝑡. The total cost function for abatement technology is 
multiplicative and expressed as hi(Kit)kit. Since we solve explicitly for investment in new 
technology capacity, the multiplicative form of the cost function has convenient properties. We 
use optimal control theory to highlight the accumulation of new abatement technology. The 
stock of technology acts as the state variable, and investments in new technology represent the 
 
5 The nomenclature for the model is summarized in Appendix A 
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control variable. The depreciation of the existing stock of abatement technology is denoted δ. 
The evolution of a firm's capacity of abatement technology is then expressed as kit − δKit6. 
 
For simplicity, we assume a proportional relationship between energy production and NOx 
emissions. Firms can reduce emissions in two ways. They can reduce production or invest in 
new abatement technology. In this model, there is one relevant type of abatement technology7. 
It can be thought of as end-of-pipe technology. This is an add-on measure used to comply with 
environmental regulations that reduces harmful substances arising as byproducts from 
production. Examples are scrubbers and catalytic converters (Frondel, Horbach, & Rennings, 
2007). Bonilla et al. (2015) argued that using a REP scheme has a positive effect on the adoption 














2 ≥ 0. Further, the function is separable, 
i.e., 
∂2 mit
∂ qit ∂ Kit
= 0. 
 
3. Model applications and analyses 
3.1.Emission constrained social optimum 
In this section, we solve the optimization problem for the regulator. The objective is to 
maximize the total net present value of the difference between profit and the costs of abatement 
technology capacity over the period from 0 to the terminating period T, given the regulator's 
binding target path of emission reductions. Henceforth, the solutions obtained in this section 
are referred to as solutions of the social optimum or socially optimal solutions. Denoting the 















6 Capacity-related issues for the output variable are not included. We are interested in studying the effect of the 
stock of abatement technology on emission reductions. Inclusion of capacity concerns for output would 
complicate the model further. We would have to add an additional state variable without a qualitative alteration 
of our main results. 
7 This is the same assumption made in Hagem et al (2015) 
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The first constraint denotes the equation of motion for the abatement technology capacity. The 
second constraint is the target of emission reductions announced by the regulator. By 
assumption, this constraint is binding. This results in a positive shadow price for the emission 
constraint. This is an expression of the costs of achieving the target path. Denoting the costate 
variable by 𝜆it and the shadow price by ηt, the corresponding present-value Hamiltonian reads: 
 




+ ∑λit(kit − δKit)
𝑛
𝑖=1




















−rt − δλit − ηtmiK = −λ̇it 
(3)  
 λiT ≥ 0 (4)  
 




+ ∑λiT(kiT − δKiT)
𝑛
𝐼=1






We take the time derivative of (2), set it equal to (3), and apply the equation of motion. Solving 


























From (7), we have obtained conditions for the marginal cost of emission reductions related to 
production adjustment and to the use of abatement technology. For both mitigation measures, 
marginal costs of emission reductions divided by the marginal effect on emission reductions 
must be equal to the shadow price for the emission constraint. If emissions are reduced by 
reducing output, the marginal cost of emission reductions is the foregone marginal profit 
divided by its marginal product on emission reduction. If a firm cuts emission through 
investment in abatement technology, the marginal cost is the extra abatement costs, divided by 
its marginal product on mission reduction. 
 
If the regulator introduces an emission tax, i.e., τt, equal to ηte
rt, per unit of emission, every 
single firm arrives at the same first-order conditions as those given in (1) to (5), and socially 
optimal solutions are obtained. This optimal tax increases in both measures of emission 
mitigation. A key assumption in this paper, however, is that the optimal emission tax is 
unavailable. In the next two sections, we analyze outcomes from using REP schemes where 
refunds are given for emission cuts and output. 
 
3.2.Refunds based on emission reductions 
The REP scheme in this section is based on the scheme currently in use in Norway. In 2007, 
Norway introduced a tax on NOx emissions for specified emission sources
8. As a response to 
the tax, several business organizations came together and proposed a solution called the NOx 
fund, which came into effect in 2008. The fund's purpose was to reduce NOx emissions and 
contribute to meeting Norway's obligation under the Gothenburg Protocol (NOx-avtalen 2018-
2025, 2017). The fund is a voluntary arrangement where the participating firms pay a charge to 
the fund per kilogram of NOx emitted. These revenues are then recycled back to the same firms 
based on verified emission cuts (NOx-fondet, 2019). Further, there is a constraint on the refund, 
such that it cannot exceed 70 percent of the cost of the NOx-reducing measure (NOx-fondet, 
2019). If the firms meet their obligations through the NOx fund, they are exempted from the 
 
8 The fee was levied on NOx emissions in energy production from: 1) propulsion machinery with total installed 
effect on more than 750 kW 2) engines, boilers, and turbines with a total effect of more than 10 MW and 3) 
flares on offshore installations and onshore facilities. These sources comprise approximately 55 percent of the 
total NOx emissions in Norway (Hagem, Holtsmark, & Sterner, 2014). 
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government's alternative NOx tax. If the firms are noncompliant, however, they must pay the 
tax in proportion to their emissions (NOx-avtalen 2018-2025, 2017). 
 
In published guides to the NOx fund, it is specified that the refund rate is given in proportion to 
annual NOx reductions, but that refunds are also restricted to cover technical installations on 
both existing and new sources of emissions (NOx-fondet, 2019). In this paper, the goal is to 
examine whether a REP scheme can be used as a cost-effective instrument to achieve a dynamic 
emission target. Hence, we model the REP scheme such that refunds are linked directly to firms' 
emission cuts. We show that it is optimal to give refunds based on emission cuts and that 
additional restrictions hamper the instrument's efficiency. 
 
Firms pay a charge, ρt, per unit of NOx emissions upfront and receive a refund, βφt, in 
proportion to their actual emission cuts. These emission cuts are defined as the difference from 
their emissions with no mitigation, m̂i. If there are no emission regulations, then from (1), the 
firm upholds production until marginal profit is zero. Then, there is no incentive to invest in 
abatement technology. Hence, the unregulated emission level is constant over time9. The refund 
consists of the refund rate φt and the constant refund constraint, β, with 0 < β < 1. The 












K̇it = kit − δKit 
 
Denoting the costate variable by 𝜉it, the corresponding present-value Hamiltonian reads: 
 
Ht = [π𝑖(qit) − h𝑖(Kit)kit − ρtmit + βφt(m̂i − mit)]e
−rt + ξit(kit − δKit) 
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
9 This result is conditional upon an emission function without drift over time. If drift is included, unregulated 






= [π′i(qit) − ρtmiq − βφtmiq]e









= [−h′i(Kit)kit − ρtmiK − βφtmiK]e
−rt − δξit = −ξ̇it 
(10)  
 ξiT ≥ 0 (11)  
 HT = [πi(qiT) − hi(Kit)kit − ρTmiT + βφT(m̂i − miT)]e
−rT + ξiT(kiT − δKiT) (12)  
 
We take the time derivative of (9), set it equal to (10), and solve for the sum of the REP charge 
and the refund. The following expression is obtained: 
 
 
ρt + βφt = −
















= ρt + βφt 
(14)  
 
The optimality conditions in (14) equal those in (7). A combination of the emission charge and 
the refund can achieve socially optimal solutions if: 
 
 ρt + βφt = τt = ηte
rt (15)  
 
A REP scheme is characterized by revenue neutrality. The budget constraint is binding for the 
sum of all the regulated firms. Denoting the optimal emission level at date t for firm i, given 
the regulation as mit





























The REP charge is a share of the optimal emission tax, determined by the emission regulation's 
stringency. The socially optimal solutions can then be achieved using a REP scheme where the 
charge is at a lower level than the optimal emission tax. Hagem et al. (2015) showed that when 
refunds are given for abatement technology costs, the REP charge is also below the first-best 
emission tax. However, this scheme was not cost-effective. In the Norwegian NOx fund, the 
REP charge is also at a lower level than the NOx tax set by the government. This was meant as 
an incentive to join the NOx fund in addition to the refund firms received (NOx-fondet, 2018). 
 
To obtain the time path of the REP charge, we take the time derivative of (17): 
 
 

















The first term on the right side is positive since the optimal emission tax increases to achieve 
the target path. The second term is negative since the target path decreases over time 
(∑ ṁit
∗𝑛
𝑖=1 < 0). Hence, the REP charge must increase over time to achieve the target path. 
 













The refund is also derived as a share of the optimal emission tax and is determined by the 
emission regulations' stringency. The refund constraint β is meant to ensure that the refund does 
not exceed a given share of the cost of the NOx-reducing measure undertaken by the firm. If it 
is reduced, then the refund rate φt must increase to ensure that (19) holds. Hence, if refunds are 
given for all emission cuts, then the refund constraint does not determine the value of the 
refund10.  
 




















From (20), we can see that the time path of the refund is ambiguous. The denominator is 
positive, but the numerator is indeterminate. We know that to achieve the announced target 
path, the optimal emission tax must increase. From (18), we saw that the REP charge also 
increases over time to achieve the announced target path. If we take the time derivative of (15) 
and rearrange, we find that if the emission tax increases at a higher rate than the REP charge, 
the refund increases as well. 
 
3.3.Refunds based on output 
The REP scheme analyzed in this section is based on the one used in Sweden. A charge is levied 
per kilogram of NOx emitted, and the funds are recycled back in proportion to the output of 
useful energy. The model in this section is based on the contributions of Gersbach & Requate 
(2004) and Sterner & Isaksson (2006). Both apply the same static model. We analyze a REP 
scheme where firms pay a charge (μt) per unit of emissions and receive a refund (σt) 
proportional to their output. We assume that output and emissions can be aggregated such that 
∑ qit = Qt 
n
i=1 and ∑ mit = Mt
n
i=1






















K̇it = kit − δKit 
 
 
11 This is the same assumption made in Sterner & Isaksson (2006). 
12 Here, we follow Sterner & Isaksson (2006). In their paper, they argue that firm i knows that there are other 
firms with total emissions (M−i) and output (Q−i). Although the firm may have expectations about these 
variables (based on previous years), they are treated as unknown constants in the firm’s optimization. 
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Denoting the costate variable it, the corresponding present-value Hamiltonian reads: 
 







] e−rt + εit(kit − δKit) 
 




= [π′i(qit) − μtmiq + σt (
Mt
Qt
+ sit (miq −
Mt
Qt









= [−h′𝑖(Kit)kit − μtmiK + σtsitmiK]e
−rt − δεit = −ε̇it 
(23)  
 εiT ≥ 0 (24)  
 







] e−rT + εiT(kiT − δKiT) 
(25)  
 


















From the budget constraint, the value of the REP charge must be equal to refund: 
 
 μt = σt (27)  
 
To derive an expression for the REP charge, we first take the time derivative of (22) and set it 
























We can see from the conditions in (29) and (7) that if output-based refunding is used to achieve 
the target path, emission mitigation incentives differ from the first-best solution. 
 
With output-based refunding, optimality conditions for both mitigation measures are influenced 
by the firm's output share. Further, the condition for production adjustments is affected by the 




). We review these in turn. 
 
In the special case where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 → 1, i.e., one firm contributes to all the output, (21) collapses to 
π′i(qit)e
−rt = 0. The firm produces until the marginal profit equals zero and the production 
level equals m̂i. With one firm paying for all emissions and receiving all the recycled revenues, 
there are no incentives to reduce emissions. Hence, there is no investment in abatement 
technology. In the other special case, 𝑠𝑖𝑡 → 0, there are many firms with insignificant output 
shares. From (23) and (28), the incentives for investment in abatement technology move 




= 0, then the incentives for investment in new abatement technology are 
socially optimal if μt = τt. The condition for production adjustments, however, is determined 
by the difference between miq and 
Mt
Qt
. Even if no firm has significant market shares, the output-
based REP scheme still provides nonoptimal incentives for production adjustments. Finally, 
when 0 < 𝑠𝑖𝑡 < 1, investments in abatement technology decrease in output share, from (28). 





, then from (29), the denominator in the first term is negative. Since μt > 0, 
marginal profit must also be negative. The optimal production level for the firm (qit
∗ )  then 
exceeds its unregulated production level (?̂?𝑖). Hence, 𝑞𝑖𝑡




denominator in (29) is positive, and the numerator must decrease along with reduced production 
for a given μt. Production is still  higher than the socially optimal level (𝑞𝑖𝑡





𝑆𝑂. Finally, if miq =
Mt
Qt
, then (21) collapses to π′i(qit)e
−rt = 0 and the firm produces 
until 𝑞𝑖𝑡
∗ = ?̂?𝑖𝑡. Unlike the case where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 → 1, however, the firm invests in abatement 
technology, such that Kit > 0 (from the condition in (23)). 
 
We can now show that to achieve the specific target path, the REP charge must be higher than 
the Pigouvian tax, 𝜏𝑡  in section 3.1. For simplicity, assume insignificant output shares. We can 





















If the regulator uses output-based refunding to achieve the target path, we have that (30) must 









For (31) to hold, we have that the REP charge must be higher than the optimal emission tax. 
Furthermore, since the output subsidy incentivizes production above the socially optimal level, 
investments in abatement technology must also be higher to ensure that the target path is met. 
 
4. Comparative statics 
In the following sections, we examine the behavior of different firms under the two REP 
schemes using comparative statics. More precisely, we consider two firms under the same 
equilibrium solution (i.e., confronted with the same values of the policy instruments) and 
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investigate where one of them has a marginally higher value of the parameter considered13. We 
focus on the parameters miq, miK, hi(Kit) and 𝜋i(qit). The results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
4.1. The difference in emission per unit of output 
4.1.1. REP scheme based on emission reductions 
For simplicity, we do not use symbols for individual firms and define the following emission 
function: m(q, K) = x(q) − y(K). This function is separable and additive. The second-order 
derivatives can be either zero or strictly positive (in this paper, they are zero). 
 
A higher emission per unit of output is denoted m = Λx(q(Λ)) − y(K), where Λ is a scalar and 
x and y are function symbols. We use the optimality condition 
π′(q(Λ))
Λx′(q(Λ))
= τ and take the total 
derivative. Since we consider two firms under the same equilibrium solution  and thus face the 
same value of τ at a given point in time, the total derivative of τ is equal to zero. This procedure 










From (32), we can see that a firm with higher emissions per unit of output has lower production 
than an otherwise identical but less emitting firm. The effect on emissions can be derived from 










We have that 
dm
dΛ






≤ 0. The final effect is determined by 




13 Alternatively, but more cumbersome, one might make a discrete comparison of two firms (i and j) under the 
















= 0. A further reduction of this 




4.1.2. REP scheme based on output 













(1 − s)μ (x′(q) −
M
Q)




From (34), we observe that the denominator is negative. Hence, the sign is determined by the 
numerator. The sign depends on the difference between the firm's emission intensity and the 
average intensity of all firms. If x′(𝑞) >
M
Q
, the numerator is positive, and hence, a more 
emitting firm reduces its production more than a less emitting but otherwise equal firm. 
Conversely, if x′(q) <
M
Q
, the numerator is negative, and the firm has a higher production. 





If the firm's emission intensity is lower than or equal to the average level, then emissions are 
unambiguously higher. For a firm with higher emission intensity than average, the effect is 













, we have 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝛬
> 0 and hence, 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝛬







0. We then obtain the same result as we did in (33). 
 
To enhance the understanding of our results in sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.2., we use an illustrative 
numerical model14. The numerical model results are obtained by using values for a "base" 
scenario to calculate the optimal emission tax, REP charges, and average emission intensity. 
These are then stored and used for all the firm types, such that we can consider firms under the 
same equilibrium solution (i.e., confronted with the same values of the policy instruments). In 
sections 4.1.1. and 4.1.2, we considered two firms where one of them had a marginally higher 
 
14 The functional forms and underlying assumptions used are shown in Appendix B. 
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value of miq. In Figure 1, we conduct a discrete comparison by looking at the difference 
between firms where the parameter difference is slightly larger than marginal. The average 
emission intensity decreases over time in the numerical model. This corresponds to the actual 
development in Sweden, where over the period 1992-2013, the average emission intensity for 
the regulated firms decreased 56 percent, while NOx emissions decreased 14 percent 
(Naturvärdsverket, 2014). 
 
The top graph in Figure 1 shows the behavior of firms that differ in terms of emission intensity 
(miq) but are otherwise identical. The bottom graph shows the emissions from the same firms. 
The emission intensity can take values between 0 and 1. In the "base" scenario, it is set to 0.5 
















































With the emission-reduction REP scheme (ERB in Figure 1, in blue), a firm with higher 
emission intensity has a lower output than an otherwise identical firm with lower emission 
intensity. Further, production monotonically decreases over time for the different firms to 
adhere to the announced target path. With the output-based REP scheme (OB in Figure 1, in 
red), it matters whether the emission intensity for a firm is higher or lower than the average 
emission intensity for all firms. In the illustrative numerical model, the average emission 
intensity has an initial level of 0.46 and decreases over time. This means that the firm from the 
"low" scenario, with an emission intensity of 0.4, initially has an emission intensity below the 
average level. As the average level decreases over time, it becomes a firm with an emission 
intensity level above average. The top graph in Figure 1 shows that its production first increases 
before it eventually decreases. For the firms in the "base" and "high" scenarios, their emission 
intensities are consistently above the average level, and their production decrease 
monotonically. 
 
The bottom graph of Figure 1 shows the emissions of the different firms. Since both REP 
schemes are used to obtain the announced target path, the "base" scenario is equal for both 
instruments. There is no clear-cut result for different firms with each REP scheme. However, 
we can compare the different firms across the two instruments. A firm with higher emission 
intensity has higher emissions in the emission reduction-based REP scheme than an otherwise 
equal firm with lower emission intensity. Furthermore, a firm with low emission intensity has 
lower emissions under the emission reduction-based REP scheme. 
 
4.2. The difference in abatement ability 
4.2.1. REP scheme based on emission reductions 
In this section, we examine the role of a firm's ability to use abatement technology to reduce 
NOx emissions (miK). We define m = x(q) − κy(K(κ)). Using the optimality condition 
(r+δ)h(K(κ))+h′(K(κ))δK(κ)
κy′(K(κ))






((r + 2δ)h′(K) + h′′(K)δ − τκy′′(K))
> 0, since y′′(K) = 0 in the model  
(36)  
 
From (36), a firm with a higher abatement ability invests more in technology than an otherwise 




4.2.2. REP scheme based on output 
We use the optimality condition 
(r+δ)h(K(κ))+h′(K(κ))δK(κ)
(1−s)κy′(K(κ))







(r + 2δ)h′(𝐾) + δKh′′(𝐾) − μ(1 − s)κy′′(𝐾)
> 0, since y′′(𝐾) =  0 in the model 
(37)  
 
A firm with a higher abatement ability invests more than an otherwise identical firm with a 
lower abatement ability. Again, emissions for firms with higher abatement ability are lower. 
 
The results from sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.2. are illustrated in Figure 2. The abatement ability 
(miK) can take values between 0 and 1. In the "base" scenario, miK is 0.3, while it is set to 0.2 
and 0.4 in the "low" and "high" scenarios, respectively. As we did in Figure 1, we consider 
firms under the same equilibrium solution and the parameter difference for miK between firms 





Figure 2: Stock of abatement technology (top) and emissions (bottom) for otherwise identical firms with different 
abatement abilities 
 
Regardless of the REP scheme, a firm with higher abatement ability invests more in new 
capacity of abatement technology than an otherwise equal firm with lower abatement ability. 
From the top graph in Figure 2, abatement technology's acquired capacity is higher for all firms 
under the output-based REP scheme. This is in accordance with the result derived in (31). For 
the same emission target, the output-based REP scheme creates stronger incentives for 
investment in abatement technology. When Sweden designed their REP scheme, it was a 























































From the bottom graph in Figure 2, we see that even if investments in abatement technology 
are higher for all firms under the output-based REP scheme, emissions are not necessarily 
lower. A comparison across the two instruments shows that a firm with high abatement ability 
has lower emissions in the output-based REP scheme. However, a firm with low abatement 
ability can have higher emissions with the output-based refunding. This is a result of the output 
subsidy that firms receive in the output-based scheme. 
 
4.3. The difference in abatement technology costs 
4.3.1. REP scheme based on emission reductions 
We define the function Φh(K(Φ)), where Φ is a scalar. Using the optimality condition, 
(r+δ)Φh(K(Φ))+Φh′(K(Φ))δK(Φ)
(1−s)y′(K(κ))





(r + δ)h(K) + h′(K)δK
((r + 2δ)Φh′(K) + h′′(K)δK − τy′′(K))
< 0, since y′′(K) = 0 in the model 
(38)  
 
A firm with higher abatement technology costs invests less in new capacity of abatement 
technology than an otherwise identical firm with lower costs. Hence, the stock of technology is 
lower. With less installed abatement technology, emissions are also higher. 
 
4.3.2. REP scheme based on output 
We use the optimality condition 
(r+δ)Φh(K(Φ))+Φh′(K(Φ))δK(Φ)
(1−s)y′(K(κ))
= μ. By taking the total 





(r + δ)h(𝐾) + h′(𝐾)δK
(r + 2δ)Φh′(𝐾) + Φh′′(𝐾)δK − (1 − s)μy′′(𝐾)
< 0, since y′′(𝐾) = 0 in the model (39)  
 
As in section 4.3.1., a firm facing higher costs invests less and has higher emissions than an 
otherwise identical firm with lower abatement technology costs. 
 
4.4. The difference in profit per unit of production 
4.4.1. REP scheme based on emission reductions 



















A firm that earns a higher profit per unit of output has higher production than an otherwise 
identical firm with lower profitability. In turn, higher production leads to higher emissions. 
 
4.4.2. REP scheme based on output 

















A firm with higher profit per unit of output has higher production and hence higher emissions 
than an otherwise equal firm that earns less per unit of output. 
 
Table 1 shows the outcomes for a firm that is otherwise identical but has a higher emission per 
unit of output, abatement ability, technology costs, and profit per unit of production. An 
increase is denoted +, a decrease is denoted -, and nonapplicable results are denoted N/A. 
 
Table 1: Results from comparative statics 
Scenarios 
Refunds based on emission reductions Refunds based on an output 
q K m(q,K) q K m(q,K) 
Difference in emissions 
per unit of output - N/A *
15 **16 N/A ***17 
Difference in abatement 
ability N/A + - N/A + - 
Difference in abatement 
technology costs N/A - + N/A - + 
Difference in profit per 
unit of production 




15 If x(q) > Λx′(q)
dq
dΛ
, then +. Otherwise, −  
16 1) If x′(𝑞) >
M
Q
, then - 2) If x′(𝑞) =
M
Q
, then 0 3) If x′(𝑞) <
M
Q
, then + 
17 1) If x′(𝑞) >
M
Q
, then + if x(q) > Λx′(q)
dq
dΛ
. Otherwise, − 2) If x′(𝑞) =
M
Q
, then 0 3) If x′(𝑞) <
M
Q
, then + 
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4.5. Comparison of distributional outcomes 
With a REP scheme, total revenues from emission payments must equal total refunds to satisfy 
the property of revenue neutrality. However, for an individual firm, refunds can be lower, equal 
to, or higher than their emission payments. In this section, we examine the distributional 
outcomes for different firms with the two REP schemes. The net payment is the difference 
between emission payments and refunds. The expressions for the net payment of a firm in the 
emission-reductions and output-based REP scheme are shown in (42) and (43), respectively. 
 
 ρtmit
∗ − βφt(m̂i − mit










The optimal emission level for firm i at date t, with the REP scheme based on emission 
reductions, given the binding announced target path, is denoted mit
∗  in (42). With the output-
based scheme, this is denoted mit
∗∗ in (43). 
 
In the following, we restrict ourselves to discussing firms with insignificant market shares 
(sit → 0). We do this for three reasons. First, from (34), the output share does not alter the sign 
of the effect. Second, we compare different firms with the two REP schemes. In the emission 
reduction-based scheme, the output share is not pertinent to the analysis. Finally, the output-
based scheme is based on the system currently in place in Sweden. There, no firm has had an 
output share of more than just above 2 percent (Sterner & Isaksson, 2006). Hence, market power 
has not been a serious source of concern. 
 
4.5.1. The difference in emission per unit of output 
For the emission reduction-based REP scheme, we know that a firm with higher emission 
intensity has a lower production level than an otherwise identical firm with lower emission 
intensity. With a negative effect from (33), emissions are also lower. This effect is also 
suggested from the results in Figure 1. Then, from (42), a firm with higher emission intensity 
has a lower emission payment than an otherwise identical firm with lower emission intensity. 
Further, the firm has a higher unregulated emission level, but actual emission cuts are also 
higher. Hence, a firm with higher emission intensity gains a higher net payment than an 




With the output-based REP scheme, it matters whether the firm's emission intensity is larger or 
smaller than the average level for all firms. If miq >
Mt
Qt
, we obtain the same result as in the 
emission reduction-based scheme. If miq <
Mt
Qt
, a firm has a higher production. With a higher 
production, emissions are also higher. Emission payments are then higher, but the firm benefits 
from an increased refund. Consequently, a firm characterized by miq <
Mt
Qt
 gains most in terms 
of net payments. 
 
4.5.2. The difference in abatement ability 
From our analytical results, we know that a firm with higher abatement ability invests more in 
new abatement technology than an otherwise identical firm with lower abatement ability under 
both REP schemes. This results in lower emissions and hence lower emission payments. 
 
In the emission reduction-based REP scheme, a firm with higher abatement ability has a lower 
unregulated emission level and a larger emission reduction than an otherwise equal firm with 
lower abatement ability. Hence, the refunds are larger, resulting in higher net payments. In the 
output-based REP scheme, with the assumption of an additive emission function 
(
∂2 mit
∂ qit ∂ Kit
= 0), refunds are not affected by the stock of abatement technology. Hence, a firm 
with higher abatement ability receives larger net payment than an otherwise identical firm with 
lower abatement ability. 
 
4.5.3. The difference in abatement technology costs 
With both REP schemes, a firm with higher abatement technology costs invests less in 
abatement technology and has larger emissions than an otherwise identical firm with lower 
technology costs. Hence, emission payments are larger. In the emission reduction-based 
scheme, a firm facing high technology costs receives a smaller refund than an otherwise 
identical firm with lower technology costs since the difference between regulated and 
unregulated emissions is smaller. Hence, a firm with lower costs of abatement technology 
receives the largest net payment. With the assumption of an additive emission function, in the 
output-based REP scheme, a firm facing lower abatement technology costs receives higher net 




4.5.4. The difference in profit per unit of production 
In the emission-reduction REP scheme, a firm with a higher profit per unit of production has a 
higher production level than an otherwise equal firm with less profitability. This results in 
higher emissions and hence emission payments. Refunds, however, are lower since the 
difference between unregulated and regulated emissions is smaller. Hence, a firm with lower 
profit per unit of output receives a higher net payment than an otherwise identical but more 
profitable firm. 
 
In the output-based REP scheme, a firm with higher profit per unit of production has higher 
production and emissions than an otherwise identical firm with lower profit per unit of output. 
This results in higher emission payments. However, since refunds are given in proportion to 
output, refunds are higher as well. Hence, it is not apparent which firms receive the highest net 
payments in this scenario. 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
In a REP scheme, a charge is levied per kilogram of NOx emissions from the regulated firms, 
and the collected revenues are refunded back to the same firms. In this paper, we analyze the 
use of two refund alternatives as instruments to regulate a negative externality. In the first 
version, firms receive refunds for their total emission cuts. In the second, refunds are given in 
the proportion to the firms’ output. 
 
Using a theoretical model, we show that a properly designed REP scheme can achieve the 
results from using a Pigouvian tax. First, both production adjustments and installment of 
abatement technology must be eligible for refunds. Second, the necessary REP charge is then 
lower than the optimal emission tax. Finally, the REP charge and the refund must be derived 
appropriately such that the sum of these two equals the optimal emission tax in each period. 
The optimal REP charge and refund are derived analytically, and their time paths are calculated. 
An output-based REP scheme can also be used to achieve the specified target path, but it 
provides nonoptimal incentives for both mitigation measures. The necessary REP charge must 
be higher than the optimal emission tax, and with refunds given in proportion to output, 
investments in new abatement technology must exceed the first-best levels as well. 
 
The firms studied in our model are heterogeneous. This allows us to study how different firms 
behave under the two REP schemes, given the binding target path of emission reductions. We 
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use comparative statics to marginally alter firm characteristics and compare otherwise identical 
firms. When both production adjustments and investments in abatement technology are eligible 
for refunds, a firm with higher emission intensity reduces production more than an otherwise 
identical firm with lower emission intensity. Our results show that the same effect applies to 
emissions. With output-based refunding, the difference between the emission intensity of a firm 
and the average emission intensity for all firms plays an important part. If the emission intensity 
is higher than average, then we derive similar results as in the emission reduction-based scheme. 
However, if a firm has a lower emission intensity than average, then a firm can increase its 
output and emissions. Further, our results show that an otherwise identical firm with either 
higher abatement ability or lower technology costs invests more in abatement technology under 
both schemes, but investment levels are higher when refunds are given in proportion to output. 
This is a consequence of the output subsidy since investments in abatement technology must be 
higher to assure that the emission target is met. 
 
By examining net payments for individual firms with the two instruments, we evaluate different 
firms' distributional outcomes. In the emission reduction-based scheme, a firm with higher 
emission intensity receives larger net payment than an otherwise identical firm with lower 
emission intensity. In the output-based REP scheme, the net winners are firms with an emission 
intensity that is low and below the average level. If refunds are given for all emission cuts, we 
find that a firm with lower profit per unit of output receives the highest net payment. The firm 
benefits from a combination of lower emission payments and higher refunds compared to an 
otherwise identical firm with higher profitability. With output-based refunding, the emission 
payments and refunds both move in the same direction, and we do not obtain a similar clear-
cut result. 
 
Apart from the ability of the studied REP schemes to achieve a specific target path of emission 
reductions, there are also additional arguments in favor of introducing this type of instrument18. 
In an experimental setting, Kallbekken, Kroll, & Cherry (2011) found that recycling tax 
revenues can increase public support for environmental taxation. The use of a refunding 
mechanism could also make it easier to introduce charges to obtain efficient emission 
reductions (Johnson, 2007; Sterner & Isaksson, 2006). Further, refunds can address concerns 
 
18 For a discussion about political economy and lobbying concerning REP schemes, see Fredriksson & Sterner 




about regulated firms' competitiveness (Sterner & Isaksson, 2006). Finally, the use of refunding 
could reduce the problem of emission leakage (Bernard, Fischer, & Fox, 2007; Fischer & Fox, 
2012; Fischer, Greaker, & Rosendahl, 2017). While the use of a REP scheme could be appealing 
for a regulator, there are also possible drawbacks from using this instrument rather than an 
emission tax or auctioned emission permits. Such instruments generate revenue that can be used 
to reduce distortionary taxes (Goulder, Parry, Williams III, & Burtraw, 1999). Furthermore, 
REP schemes violate the pure polluter pays principle since emitting firms receive refunds even 
though they are responsible for emissions. 
 
Our results show that a REP scheme can achieve a specific dynamic emission target. However,  
the choice of refund mechanism affects both the costs of regulation and the distributional 
outcome for individual firms. As mentioned above, there are also accompanying arguments in 
favor of using a REP scheme. Hence, if optimal pricing instruments such as a Pigouvian tax are 
























A. The nomenclature used in the model 
Symbol Description 
mit Emission level of NOx at date t for firm i 
m̂i Emission level for firm i, with no regulations 
mit
∗  Optimal emission level at date t for firm i, given the binding target path 
M̅t Total target level of NOx emissions at date t 
ω Rate of emission reductions desired by the regulator 
qit Production at date t for firm i 
?̂?i Production for firm i, with no regulations 
𝑞it
∗  Optimal production at date t for firm i, given the binding target path 
Kit Capacity of abatement technology at date t for firm i 
kit Investment in new capacity of abatement technology for firm i at date t, with kit≥ 0 
πi(qit) Profit for firm i at date t 
τt Optimal emission tax at date t 
ρt REP charge in the emission reductions REP scheme at date t 
φt Support rate in the emission reductions REP scheme at date t 
β Refund constraint the emission reductions REP scheme, with 0 < β < 1 
βφt Refund in the emission reductions REP scheme 
μt REP charge in the output REP scheme at date t 
σt Refund in the output REP scheme at date t 
miq Marginal effect of production on emissions for firm i 
miK Marginal effect of abatement technology on emissions for firm i 
r Market discount rate 
𝛿 Depreciation rate of abatement technology capacity 
T Termination date of problem considered 
 
B. Functional forms and assumptions used in the illustrative numerical model 
πi′(qit) = Ai − qit(2ci + bi),  hi(Kit) = piKit
2,  h′i(Kit) = 2piKit, h′′i(Kit) = 2pi 
and mit = (θiqit − αiKit) 
 
The "base" scenario uses the following parameter values: 
 




When we illustrate the output-based REP scheme, we simplify by assuming that firms have 
insignificant output shares. For the numerical illustration, the optimization problem for firm i 












K̇it = kit − δKit 
 






















From B.II, the refund is now a share of the REP charge, determined by the size of the average 
emission intensity. The expression of B.II. is a good representation of how the refund is defined 
in the Swedish REP scheme. There, it is calculated as total paid emission charges divided by 
total useful energy produced (Naturvärdsverket, 2014). 
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Transport choice and negative externalities in a 

























































This paper is concerned with the regulation of negative externalities from road transport. We 
study the problem of transport choice for a fixed number of commuters who make a required 
work trip  in a congested urban area. They can use either a fossil car, an electric car or public 
transport. Each alternative is responsible for a specific set of negative externalities. Four types 
of externalities are considered (congestion, crowding, CO2 emission and other local 
externalities).The long-term equilibrium outcomes for transport choice in the private and 
socially optimal outcomes are analyzed and we discuss the use of instruments for optimal 
regulation. By including electric cars, we can study the trade-offs for regulation of local and 
global externalities. The effect of the different externalities is explored using comparative 
statics. Congestion costs are shown to be particularly important. An optimal internalization  of 
the externalities can be achieved with a “sandwich” of economic instruments that are 
differentiated to account for different damage intensities from different vehicle types. This key 
result is underscored with comparisons of long-run outcomes from partial instrument use. Such 







1 The paper benefitted from comments and suggestions from Eirik S. Amundsen and Frode Meland. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 




The transport sector is a considerable source of emissions of greenhouse gases, such as CO2. In 
2019, the sector was responsible for 24 percent of direct CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. 
Road transport (cars, trucks, buses and two- and three-wheelers) accounted for around three-
quarters of this (IEA, 2020b). Further, the transport sector is responsible for local negative 
externalities (congestion, local emissions, noise, accidents, and road wear). These externalities 
can impose considerable costs on society, highlighting the importance of efficient regulation. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine some important economic principles for the regulation 
of negative externalities from road transport. Using a partial equilibrium model, we analyze the 
problem of transport choice for a fixed number of commuters making an essential work trip in 
an urban area. The commuters can use either a fossil car, an electric car, or public transport. 
Each mode is responsible for a specific composition of negative externalities. We consider four 
categories of externalities: congestion, crowding, CO2 emissions, and other local externalities 
(local pollution (NOx and particulate matter); noise; accidents; and road wear). The equilibrium 
conditions studied in this paper are long-term. Hence, we focus on the following problem: if 
there are no regulations, what will the equilibrium condition for transport choice look like, and 
if the negative externalities are internalized, what will this new equilibrium look like? We stress 
the importance of coherent regulation, in which each externality is taken into account through 
the use of a targeted economic instrument differentiated to account for differences in emission 
intensities. Within our framework, we show that with a “sandwich” of instruments comprising 
a uniform congestion tax and a differentiated pollution tax for cars, a CO2 tax for fossil cars and 
a mark-up on the fare for public transport, the regulator can achieve the socially optimal 
outcome. This is a key result, and we highlight its importance by analyzing several long-run 
equilibrium outcomes from partial instrument use. We consider three economic instruments and 
one technical instrument and show that their use will result in insufficient regulation. Further, 
such a strategy can be costly and can result in unintended consequences. Finally, we conduct 
comparative statics for different cost parameters and discuss the long-run equilibriums 
concerning transport choice and regulation. Specifically, we note the importance of the 
congestion costs faced by the commuters. 
 
There is an extensive literature focusing on externalities from transport. The diversity of these 
externalities includes congestion (Newbery, 1990; Vickrey, 1969; Walters, 1961), road wear 
(Newbery, 1988a), global emissions (I. W. Parry, Walls, & Harrington, 2007), local emissions 
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(Calthrop & Proost, 1998; I. W. Parry et al., 2007; Verhoef, 1994), noise (Swärdh & Genell, 
2020) and accidents (Newbery, 1988b; Santos, Behrendt, Maconi, Shirvani, & Teytelboym, 
2010). 
 
Further, there have been numerous contributions focusing on instruments to internalize  
negative externalities from road transport Many of these have used theoretical and simulation 
models (Beaudoin et al., 2018; De Borger & Wouters, 1998; Diamond, 1973; Johansson-
Stenman, 2006; Johansson, 1997; Newbery, 1990; I. W. Parry & Small, 2005; I. W. H. Parry, 
2002; Rouwendal & Verhoef, 2006; Tsekeris & Voß, 2009; Wangsness, Proost, & Rødseth, 
2020). There are also several empirical papers examining the effect of different instruments 
(Beaudoin & Lawell, 2018; Gallego, Montero, & Salas, 2013; Knittel & Sandler, 2018; Small, 
Winston, & Yan, 2005). 
 
The paper contributes to the literature on the regulation of negative externalities from road 
transport. Using four categories of externalities, we focus on the difference in the long-run 
private and socially optimal outcomes on the transport choice of commuters. Our approach 
allows us to examine the effect of the different externalities on the equilibrium outcomes. 
Further, we examine key insights from economics regarding the regulation of negative 
externalities and discuss important economic principles for achieving a socially optimal 
outcome. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other papers using a similar setup to 
analyze this problem of regulation. The inclusion of electric cars also enables us to highlight 
the trade-off in the regulation of local and global negative externalities. Since there is a 
discussion of whether electric cars can be part of the solution to the problem of global (Jochem, 
Doll, & Fichtner, 2016) and local pollution (Timmers & Achten, 2016) from transport, this is a 
highly relevant addition to the analysis. We also examine partial instrument use and conduct 
comparative statics for different cost parameters. Using formal analyses, we obtain results that 
allow us to underscore the important point of coherent and differentiated regulation. A deviation 
from this strategy leads to costly, inadequate, and, in some cases, counterproductive regulation 
of negative externalities from road transport. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in section 2, along 
with accompanying assumptions. In section 3, we apply the model and derive the equilibrium 
conditions for both the private and socially optimal solutions. We stress key economic 
principles for the use of economic instruments to internalize the negative externalities from 
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transport. Further, we perform comparative statics to show the effects on transport choice in the 
long-run private and socially optimal equilibrium outcomes. In section 4, we analyze the 
outcomes when the regulator pursues a strategy of partial use of instruments and discuss the 
implications of this strategy. We look at three economic instruments and one technical 
instrument. Summary and concluding remarks are provided in section 5. 
 
2. The model3 
We analyze the long-run private and socially optimal equilibrium conditions for the transport 
choice of the commuters. We examine the equilibrium condition without regulation and then 
look at the effects of internalizing the negative externalities from road transport4. Further, we 
consider important economic principles for regulators who seek to minimize the social costs 
from externalities. The use of first-best pricing instruments entails that the instruments must be 
differentiated with respect to geography, time of the day and distance (Anas & Lindsey, 2011). 
To simplify, the trips studied in our model are taken during rush hour; hence, off-peak periods 
are not considered. Moreover, we focus on a densely populated urban area. The trip is identical 
for all commuters. They can choose between a fossil car (xf), an electric car (xe) or public 
transport (xp), and there is a fixed number of trips taken (x̅). This is well-used assumption that 
can be relaxed. The purpose of the trip is deemed essential to secure an economic outcome. We 
assume that all commuters have a fixed utility for the trip (u̅) but not necessarily the same 
utility. To ensure that the trip is made, for all commuters, the utility is always of greater order 
than the minimized cost of making the trip. Hence, since both the utility and the number of 
commuters is fixed, we analyze the problem of transport choice as a cost-minimization problem. 
 
The user costs for the different transport modes are composed of two parts. For private 
transport, these costs consist of imputed costs and congestion costs. Public transport consists of 
imputed costs and crowding costs. The imputed costs are made up of costs related to fuel, time 
consumption of travel, comfort of transport, vehicle maintenance, parking, and the car price. 
The imputed unit costs are assumed to be highest for public transport and lowest for fossil cars, 
i.e., cf < ce < cp. The high imputed costs from using public transport are due to the relative 
discomfort and lack of flexibility of using public transport. In particular, the use of public 
 
3 The nomenclature used in the model is summarized in Appendix A 
4 Goods transport is not included in the model. For goods transport, the same choices are not relevant, i.e., 
switching from a truck to using public transport. For a discussion on a separate system for the transport industry, 
we refer to other contributions (Pinchasik & Hovi, 2017). 
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transport entails time costs that include waiting on the platform and being forced to plan 
according to inconvenient timetables. Previous research points to perceived benefits for 
commuters in which private rather than public transport is used. A car can be perceived as a 
symbol of freedom, independence and status (Steg, 2003, 2005); it may also provide 
psychosocial benefits (feelings of autonomy, protection and self-esteem) (Ellaway, Macintyre, 
Hiscock, & Kearns, 2003). Further, the imputed costs are assumed to be higher for electric cars 
than for fossil cars. Although fuel is cheaper, electric car owners face a higher annuity for the 
car price. In addition, there might be concerns regarding the range and the possibility of 
charging an electric car. The focus of the model is to analyze the long-term equilibrium under 
the condition of no regulations and with the inclusion of externalities. Hence, in the basic model, 
it is assumed that there are no governmental subsidies for electric cars. 
 
Apart from imputed costs, car users also face congestion costs that are denoted as  g(xf + xe). 
The congestion cost function is increasing in the number of cars. With an increase in the 
number of cars, the road traffic speed decreases, increasing travel time; hence, the congestion 
costs increase (Newbery, 1990). With more cars on the road, all cars face these congestion 
costs. Public transport at least partly uses designated lanes. In the model, we assume that 
public transport uses a separate lane from private transport; hence, public transport users do 
not face congestion costs. However, commuters using public transport face crowding aboard 
the public transport service. This crowding cost is the discomfort of using a crowded and 
undersized public transport service plus the time cost of not being able to enter a completely 
full bus and of having to wait for the next. The crowding costs on public transport are denoted 
as m(xp, y̅) and are assumed to increase in the number of passengers. With more passengers 
boarding, crowding and passenger discomfort increase as well (Kraus, 1991). If the number of 
trips taken by public transport is below a certain capacity threshold (xp < ?̅?), then the cost of 
using public transport is cp. However, if the threshold is exceeded, then the crowding cost is 
also present. We will focus on the scenario in which the capacity threshold is exceeded 
(xp ≥ ?̅?). This cost increases in additional passengers, i.e., mxp
′ (xp, y̅) > 0 and is reduced if 
the capacity is expanded, i.e., my̅
′ (xp, y̅) < 0. 
 
We include four categories of negative externalities. The first is the congestion externalities for 
cars. An extra car on the road increases the congestion costs for all other cars. This externality 
is equal for both car types. The second is the crowding externality aboard the public transport 
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service. When an additional passenger boards, it increases the crowding for all the other 
passengers. The third is CO2 emissions from fossil cars. The cost function for CO2 emissions is 
denoted as  e per commuter and increases linearly in the number of commuters using fossil cars. 
For simplicity, the use of public transport does not cause CO2 emissions in the model. A bus 
seats many passengers, and the marginal effect on CO2 emissions from one more commuter 
using the bus can be assumed to be rather small (Proost & Van Dender, 2011) Hence, we 
simplify and set the effect equal to zero. 
 
Finally, we have the other local negative externalities. These are bundled in the pollution cost 
function h(xf + αxe). This externality inflicts costs on the inhabitants of the urban area at large 
and is not assumed to be directed towards the commuters causing the externality. The pollution 
cost function is increasing in the number of cars. Even though there are no CO2 emissions from 
the use of electrical cars, these cars still cause local pollution through non-exhaust sources, such 
as the wear of tires, brakes and road surfaces, as well as the whirling up of particulates through 
road dust (Timmers & Achten, 2016). As a local externality, this pollution is considered for a 
fossil car by assuming a damage intensity that is normalized to one and of which an electric car 
has a share. The share is denoted α, where 0 < α < 1. Such a relationship can be derived from 
Rødseth et al. (2019). It was assumed that the use of public transport does not cause CO2 
emissions. This same assumption is made for local externalities as well. Assuming only 
crowding externalities for public transport is a simplification (I. W. Parry & Small, 2009). 
However, we look at the marginal effect of an additional commuter using public transport, and 
therefore, we simplify by assuming the marginal effect for local externalities is equal to zero. 
 
3. Model applications and analyses 
3.1. Private solution 
We begin the analysis with a scenario in which a representative commuter makes a choice 
regarding the transport mode. Since the utility and the number of commuters in our model are 
fixed, the problem facing the commuter is a cost minimization problem. The focus in this 
section is to analyze the long-term equilibrium condition for transport choice under the 
condition that regulation is absent and that externalities are not internalized. Hence, we do not 
consider the short-term adjustments of how a commuter with a fossil car will adapt to the 
introduction of different instruments. Even though externalities are not included here, crowding 
and congestion costs are included, since these are costs faced by the commuters. The 




min{cf +  g(xf + xe), ce +  g(xf + xe), cp + m(xp, y̅)} 
 
In equilibrium, the commuter must be indifferent between the different transport alternatives. 
Further, a condition for equilibrium is a binding constraint of a fixed number of trips. This can 
be expresses as follows: 
 
xf + xe + xp = x̅ 
 
The equilibrium condition then reads as follows: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) = ce +  g(xf + xe) = cp + m(xp, y̅) (1)  
 
The imputed unit costs are fixed for all transport modes. Hence, the congestion and crowding 
costs are instrumental for the adjustments to obtain an equilibrium solution. 
 
We can start out by comparing the indifference conditions for the two car types: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) = ce +  g(xf + xe) (2)  
 
Since congestion costs are equal for both car types, we have that the condition in (2) can only 
hold if the imputed costs are equal. By assumption, cf < ce. Hence, the result in (2) cannot hold, 
and no commuters will choose electric cars. Note that this corner solution is contingent upon 
the simplified functional forms. However, the result is interesting in that in a situation with no 
regulation (including the absence of governmental subsidies) and no externalities internalized, 
there are no clear incentives to switch from a fossil car to an electric car. 
 
We can compare the indifference conditions for fossil cars and public transport: 
 
 cf +  g(xf) = cp + m(xp, y̅) (3)  
 
Since we have assumed that cf < cp, the congestion costs for fossil cars must be larger than the 
crowding costs for public transport for the condition in (3) to hold. Both congestion and 
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crowding costs are determined by the number of commuters using the two transport modes. 
Hence, they are instrumental for obtaining a long-run equilibrium. Under the assumptions of 
the model, with two equations and two unknowns and a fixed number of trips, there exists an 
equilibrium solution that determines the distribution of the commuters’ transport choice. 
 
3.1.1. Socially optimal solution 
The objective for the regulator is to ensure that the commuters make their essential work trip 
and to minimize the social costs stemming from the negative externalities. In this section, we 
analyze the long-run equilibrium when the negative externalities from transport are considered. 
As previously mentioned, we study the scenario in which the capacity threshold is exceeded for 
public transport. Hence, crowding costs and externalities are present. The regulator can invest 
in expanded capacity for public transport. This investment benefits all users of the public 
transport service since it reduces crowding. The cost of expansion is expressed by the 
investment function i(y̅). The costs increase in additional expanded capacity, i.e., i′(y̅) > 0. 
The optimization problem reads as follows: 
 
min SC = (cf + e +  g(xf + xe))xf + (ce +  g(xf + xe))xe + (cp + m(xp, y̅)) xp + i(y̅)
+ h(xf + αxe) 
 
subject to the constraint of a fixed number of trips, which is assumed to be binding: 
 
 xf + xe + xp ≤ x̅ (λ) 
 












= cp + m(xp, y̅) + mxp










We begin with the first-order condition from (7). This can be rearranged to obtain the following: 
 
 i′(y̅) = −my̅
′ (xp, y̅)xp (8)  
 
The condition in (8) states that investments take place until the marginal investment costs are 
equal to the marginal benefits of decreasing crowding by capacity expansion. If the crowding 
is too high, i.e., if  i′(y̅) < −my̅
′ (xp, y̅)xp, the regulator increases the investment to obtain the 
condition in (8). The reduced crowding reduces the crowding cost m(xp, y̅). 
 
The investment costs are not included in the first-order conditions in (4)–(6). This cost is 
assumed to be covered by all commuters as a one-time payment. Hence, it does not affect the 
marginal decisions made by the commuters and can be considered a “head tax”. In our model, 
all commuters are willing to make this payment because the utility of making the essential work 
trip (u̅) is assumed to be of a higher order than the sum of transport costs and the “head tax”. 
 
We combine (4)–(6) to obtain the equilibrium conditions: 
 
 cf + e +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe)
= ce +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + αh′(xf + αxe)
= cp + m(xp, y̅) + mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp 
(9)  
 
First, we compare the indifference conditions for fossil and electric cars: 
 
 cf + e +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe)
= ce +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + αh′(xf + αxe) 
(10)  
 
If we compare (10) with (2), we can see that there could be electric cars in the socially optimal 
solution. For the condition in (10) to hold, we must have that ce > cf + e, since 0 < α < 1. 
This is to ensure that unlike what we did in section 3.1., we do not obtain a corner solution. 
Since congestion costs are equal for both car types, the congestion externalities, denoted 
by g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe), are equal as well. However, for electric cars, due to a lower damage 
intensity, the effect from the other local externalities is smaller. Finally, only the use of fossil 
cars causes CO2 emissions, with a marginal effect denoted as e. Hence, compared to the private 
solution, the socially optimal solution contains increased costs for both car types, but fossil cars 
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have the largest cost increase. This means that in the socially optimal solution, there will be a 
decrease in the number of trips taken by fossil cars, and a part of this reduction should be 
absorbed by electric cars. 
 
Next, we compare the indifference conditions for fossil cars and public transport: 
 
 cf + e +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe)
= cp + m(xp, y̅) + mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp 
(11)  
 
Compared to the private solution in (3), the socially optimal solution now includes an additional 
cost of using public transport, namely, the externality cost denoted as mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp. This stems 
from the crowding externality imposed by an additional passenger on the other passengers. 
 
With the condition in (8), we showed that the regulator invests to expand the public transport 
capacity until the point at which the marginal investment costs equal the marginal benefit of 
increased capacity. There is the question of why the regulator would be interested in making 
this investment. First, it will reduce the crowding aboard public transport. Second, of the 
transport modes considered, public transport contributes to the lowest number of externalities 
per trip. Hence, it would be in the interest of the regulator to incentivize this type of travel. 
Finally, if more commuters choose public transport, this reduces the congestion costs for private 
transport and, thus, reduces social costs. 
 
The question is whether there exists a solution in which all three transport alternatives are 
present. From the equilibrium condition in (9), and the constraint of a fixed number of trips, we 
have three equations and three unknowns. Under the assumptions of the model, an equilibrium 
may exist. The inclusion of negative externalities socially increases the costs for all three 
transport modes. Note that to avoid a corner solution in condition (10), we must have that ce >
cf + e. Further, if the cost increase for fossil cars is larger than that for public transport, i.e., 
e + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe) > mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp, then the use of public transport 
increases at the expense of fossil cars. Hence, in the socially optimal equilibrium, there should 
be a decrease in the use of fossil cars compared with that in the private solution in section 3.1. 
Further, our results suggest that commuters will switch to both electric cars and public transport 




The regulator can internalize the negative externalities analyzed in this section. This will require 
coherent regulation and the use of targeted instruments that consider the differentiated effects 
of the various externalities. More precisely, the use of four economic instruments in a 
“sandwich” arrangement targeting specific externalities directly can achieve the socially 
optimal outcome. The first instrument is a congestion tax, which will be equal for both car types 
and can be denoted as τ = g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe). The second instrument is a carbon tax, which 
is levied only on fossil cars and can be expressed as κ = e. Third, we have a local pollution tax. 
To obtain an optimal outcome, this tax must be differentiated for the two car types: it will be 
ρ = h′(xf + αxe) for a fossil car and αρ for an electric car. The final instrument is a mark-up 
on the public transport fare. This instrument internalizes the crowding externality aboard the 
public transport service and can be denoted by υ = mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp5. 
 
In this section, we have shown how the use of economic principles with the direct pricing of 
negative externalities can bring about socially optimal outcomes. In practice, however, efficient 
pricing instruments can be difficult to introduce (Anas & Lindsey, 2011). It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to examine the obstacles and the political economics of the implementation of 
efficient instruments. Our objective is to analyze the effect of externalities on the socially 
optimal transport choice and to discuss the internalization of these externalities by using 
important principles from the economics of regulation. 
 
While it is in the interest of the regulator to invest in the expansion of public transport capacity, 
it is also sound to charge commuters a mark-up on the public transport fare. This result may 
appear somewhat counterintuitive. With more passengers aboard the public transport service, 
this increases crowding and hence the discomfort for the other passengers (Kraus, 1991). 
Crowding can create feelings of anxiety and stress, concerns about safety, and a feeling of an 
invasion of privacy (Tirachini, Hensher, & Rose, 2013). If the users of public transport impose 
an externality on the other passengers, it is not unreasonable that the users should be charged 
for this. When an externality is present, the marginal social cost of using public transport 
increases, which can justify a mark-up on the fare (Jara-Diaz & Gschwender, 2005; Pedersen, 
 
5 We have focused on the scenario in which a certain capacity threshold for public transport is exceeded. In this 
case, crowding costs (and externalities) are present. However, if the threshold is not exceeded (xp < ?̅?), then the 
cost of using public transport consists only of the imputed unit costs. Then, in equilibrium, the other transport 
alternatives must adjust to this fixed cost. Since there is no crowding, the regulator does not need to introduce a 
mark-up on the fare, and we obtain that υ = 0. 
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2003). Further, if the revenues from the increased fare are used to improve the public transport 
service, this benefits the users of public transport as well. 
 
If it is desirable to make commuters switch to public transport, then presumably, it could be 
reasonable to subsidize public transport fares. There are basically two main justifications for 
this. First, it has been argued that public transport operates under conditions of economics of 
scale. The marginal social cost of supplying a trip with public transport is then lower than the 
average cost. An increase in route density or service frequency will decrease the users’ waiting 
or access costs for public transport services (Mohring, 1972). However, if crowding 
externalities are considered, more passengers aboard the public transport service can also 
increase the social cost of traveling (Jara-Diaz & Gschwender, 2005). Second, cheaper fares 
can incentivize people to switch from private to public transport. This will then reduce the 
externalities from car use (I. W. Parry & Small, 2009). However, subsidizing fares could also 
have disadvantages. The funding of subsidies will entail distorting taxes (Newbery, 1990), and 
for shorter trips, people could switch from walking and bicycling to public transport (Van 
Goeverden, Rietveld, Koelemeijer, & Peeters, 2006). Finally, public transport contributes to 
externalities such as congestion and pollution, in addition to crowding aboard the public 
transport service (I. W. Parry & Small, 2009). 
 
3.2. Comparative statics 
In this section, we investigate the effects of changes in various cost parameters on long-run 
equilibrium outcomes of transport choice. We can then compare different outcomes with the 
private and socially optimal long-run equilibrium conditions. Since we focus more on imputed 
costs later in the paper, we will not visit them here. Instead, we focus on the remaining cost 
elements derived in sections 3.1. and 3.1.1.6 The mathematical derivations can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
3.2.1. Effects in the private solution 
In the private solution, there are only fossil cars and public transport. Denoting the variable 𝜒, 
which expresses a general notation for the parameters of a cost increase (γ, 𝛿, μ, η, φ and ω), 
 
6 The comparative statics is carried out with a multiplicative increase in costs. The analyses have also been 









. From the equilibrium condition in (1), there are two types of costs to be 
examined, congestion costs and crowding costs. 
 








Compared with the equilibrium in the private solution, the condition in which there is an 
increase in congestion costs is characterized by a decrease in the number of commuters using 
fossil cars and an increase in the number of commuters using public transport. The result is a 
decrease in congestion, CO2 emissions, and local pollution, while the crowding aboard public 
transport is increased. 
 








With an increase in crowding costs, the share of commuters using fossil cars is larger than that 
in the private equilibrium condition. With more trips taken by fossil cars, there will be an 
increase in congestion, CO2 emissions and local pollution. There will also be a reduction in 
crowding on public transport. 
 
3.2.2. Effects in the socially optimal solution 









). Further, from (9), there are 
four cost categories under consideration for the comparative statics: congestion costs, costs of 
CO2 emissions, local pollution costs, and crowding costs aboard public transport. 
 

















Since congestion costs (and externalities) are equal for both car types, the indifference 
condition between these can be written as follows: 
 




Due to the equilibrating cost mechanism, the congestion costs increase in part spills over to 
public transport, which experiences an increase in its use, and car transport decreases. The 
latter would, ceteris paribus, lead to less local pollution. This would distort the indifference 
condition between fossil and electric cars that necessitates that local pollution stays constant, 
implying that xf + αxe remains constant (see condition (12)). With a decrease in car transport, 
constant local pollution can only come about if the number of fossil cars increases and the 
number of electric cars (that are less pollutive) decreases more. Compared with the 
equilibrium condition in (9), the new equilibrium is characterized by lower congestion 
together with higher CO2 emissions and crowding, while local pollution remains constant. 
 


















Further, the indifference condition between the two car types must hold with equality: 
 
 (1 − α)h′(xf + αxe) = ce − cf − ηe (13)  
 
A differentiation of (13) shows that local pollution must decrease. 
 
With an increase in costs from CO2 emissions, fossil car use becomes socially more expensive 
than both the use of electric cars and the use of public transport. To secure a decrease in fossil 
car use, a decrease in local pollution costs and a preservation of the indifference condition 
between electric cars and public transport, we must have an increase in electric car use (which 
are less pollutive) slightly greater than the decrease in the use of fossil car. In addition, there 
will be a slight decrease in public transport use. Then, compared to the socially optimal 
outcome in section 3.1.1, the new equilibrium is characterized by decreased CO2 emissions, 
local pollution, and crowding, while there is a slight increase in congestion. 
 
The results above might seem counterintuitive since increased costs from CO2 emissions 
result in a decrease in public transport use. This paradox is contingent upon assumptions made 
in the model. The commuters’ willingness to pay to make the trip exceeds the costs of 
transport, and the number of trips is constant, even after the cost increase. Further, we saw 
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from the equilibrium condition in (10) that we must have that ce > cf + e to ensure that we do 
not obtain a corner solution for either car type. 
 

















The indifference condition between fossil and electric cars is as follows: 
 
 cf + e + φh′(xf + αxe) = ce + αφh′(xf + αxe) (14)  
 
A differentiation of (14) shows that local pollution must be lower after the increase in local 
pollution costs. 
 
An increase in local pollution costs makes private transport socially more costly than public 
transport, but the increase is largest for fossil cars. Further, the cost increase also makes the 
use of fossil cars socially more costly than electric cars, as seen from (14). Hence, a decrease 
in total car use will increase these distortions. However, a decrease in fossil cars coupled with 
an equivalent increase in electric cars will resolve both of these issues. First, local pollution 
will decrease since electric cars are less pollutive. This will close the cost cap between fossil 
and electric cars. Second, reduced local pollution will result in an asymmetric cost increase 
for private versus public transport. Hence, the increase in local pollution costs is nullified in 
its entirety by the increase in electric cars. The marginal cost of using private versus public 
transport remains the same, although the composition of the car fleet is altered. In the new 
equilibrium, CO2 emissions and local pollution are decreased, while congestion and crowding 
remain unaltered. 
 

















We have the following indifference condition for the two car types: 
 




The equilibrating mechanisms ensure that an increase in crowding costs spills over to private 
transport, with increased car use and decreased use of public transport. An increase in car use, 
would, ceteris paribus, result in more local pollution, distorting thereby between the two car 
types, the indifference condition, which states that local pollution stays constant (see 
condition (15)). An increase in car use and a condition of constant local pollution can only 
hold if there is a decrease in fossil cars and a larger increase in electric cars (which are less 
pollutive). Hence, compared with the socially optimal condition in section 3.1.1, the new 
equilibrium is characterized by lower CO2 emissions and decreased crowding, while there is 
an increase in congestion. 
 
The results from the comparative statics are summarized in Table 1. The results under the 
labels “Private solution” and “Socially optimal solution” denote the outcomes in the new 
equilibria compared to the initial equilibrium conditions in the private and socially optimal 
solutions, respectively. Increases are denoted as +, decreases are denoted as -, and non-
applicable results are denoted as N/A. 
 
Table 1. Results from comparative statics 
 Private solution Socially optimal solution 
xf xe xp xf xe xp 
Congestion costs - N/A + + - + 
Costs of CO2-emissions N/A N/A N/A - + - 
Local pollution costs N/A N/A N/A - + 0 
Crowding costs + N/A - - + - 
 
4. Comparisons of partial instrument use  
In section 3.1.1., we derived the socially optimal transport choice. Further, we discussed how 
the regulator could achieve this solution through coherent regulation by using a “sandwich” of 
targeted economic instruments. In practice, however, it is more common to apply a strategy of 
partial instrument use. In the following sections, we explore examples of such a strategy and 
examine its implications. The equilibrium outcomes are compared with the preceding private 
solution, as well as the socially optimal outcome from section 3.1.1. We focus on four 
alternatives, including three economic instruments and one technical instrument: a tax on fossil 
cars; a subsidy for electric cars; a congestion tax for both car types; and finally, a rule that 





4.1 A tax levied on the use of fossil cars 
In this section, we examine the scenario in which the regulator implements a tax on the use of 
fossil cars. This is a well-established strategy and can take many forms (fuel tax, toll payment, 
emission tax, etc.). Here, we do not focus on one specific type of tax but instead concentrate on 
the equilibrium outcome when the regulator increases user costs for fossil cars. The 
optimization problem reads as follows: 
 
min{cf +  g(xf + xe) + t, ce +  g(xf + xe), cp + m(xp, y̅)} 
 
The equilibrium condition, contingent on the restriction of a fixed number of trips, reads as 
follows: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) + t = ce +  g(xf + xe) = cp + m(xp, y̅) (16)  
 
First, we compare the indifference conditions for the two car types: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) + t = ce +  g(xf + xe) (17)  
 
We have not defined the level of the fossil car tax, but this is of course of critical importance. 
If the tax is set too low, the result would be a reduction in fossil cars and an increase in the use 
of public transport but not necessarily any use of electric cars in equilibrium. We would then 
still have a corner solution for electric cars. Conversely, if the tax is set high enough, then one 
could obtain the corner solution in which the commuters use only public transport and electric 
cars. In the following discussion, we assume that the tax is set at a sufficiently high level to 
incentivize the use of electric cars. From (17), this means that the tax must be equal to ce − cf. 
This is a knife-edge solution in which the shares of fossil and electric cars are indeterminate. 
 
If we compare the indifference conditions for fossil cars and public transport, we obtain the 
following: 
 




We have a constraint of a fixed number of commuters. Taking the implicit differential with 




























The implementation of the tax on fossil cars then leads to an increase in the use of public 
transport and a decrease in car use. This results in a new equilibrium with less congestion, less 
local pollution, and less CO2 emissions. The magnitude of these reductions depends on the 
composition of fossil and electric cars in the new equilibrium. On the other hand, the crowding 
on public transport will increase. In a sense,  the emission tax is therefore in part shifted over 
to public transport. 
 
We can compare the equilibrium outcome in this section with the socially optimal outcome. 
The tax is levied on fossil cars, and we obtain a reduction in fossil car use (even if no new 
electric cars enter, the fossil car use cannot increase). The reduced use of cars also reduces CO2 
emissions, congestion, and local pollution. The increased use of public transport leads to more 
crowding. Contrary to the socially optimal solution, in this situation, only fossil cars are 
regulated. This means that there are no separate regulation mechanisms that increase costs for 
electric cars and public transport, internalizing the externalities from their use. The exact 
outcome depends on the composition of the different transport alternatives in the new 
equilibrium. 
 
4.2. A subsidy provided for use of electric cars 
In this scenario, electric cars receive remuneration in the form of a subsidy. The reasoning 
behind such a policy could be that the regulator wants to reduce CO2 emissions. This can be 
done in different ways (free public parking, subsidized fuel, reduced toll fees, etc.). The 
optimization problem reads as follows: 
 




With the constraint of a fixed number of trips, we obtain the following equilibrium condition: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) = ce +  g(xf + xe) − s = cp + m(xp, y̅) (20)  
 
We start out by comparing the indifference conditions for both car types: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) = ce +  g(xf + xe) − s (21)  
 
We can see from (21) that for commuters to be indifferent between fossil and electric cars, the 
subsidy must cover the cost difference ce − cf. This was the equivalent size of the tax in the 
previous section. Again, this is a knife-edge solution in which the shares of fossil and electric 
cars are indeterminate. If the subsidy is set at a lower level, commuters would strictly prefer 
fossil cars over electric cars, and we would obtain a corner solution. A sufficiently high subsidy 
could be introduced that displaced fossil cars entirely (and even public transport); however, this 
is not considered to be a desired outcome. In the following, we assume that the subsidy is set at 
a level such that commuters are indifferent between a fossil and electric car. 
 
For the indifference conditions for electric cars and public transport, we obtain the following: 
 
 ce +  g(xf + xe) − s = cp + m(xp, y̅) (22)  
 
With the constraint of a fixed number of commuters, we take the implicit differential with 




























A subsidy for electric cars results in a decrease in public transport use and an increase in total 
car use. From (21), the subsidy unambiguously lowers the cost of electric car use compared to 
that for fossil cars. Since total car use increases, a reduction in fossil cars must be less than the 
increase in electric cars. This results in more congestion, more local pollution and less CO2 
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emissions and crowding in this situation than in the case before the introduction of the subsidy. 
The magnitude of these changes depends on the composition of fossil and electric cars in the 
new equilibrium. 
 
The use of subsidies for electric cars alone is not able to achieve the socially optimal outcome. 
If commuters switch from fossil to electric cars, then CO2 emissions decrease unambiguously. 
However, congestion does not decrease. Since the use of public transport decreases, congestion 
will increase, while crowding will decrease. An electric car causes fewer local negative 
externalities than a fossil car, but if commuters also switch from public transport to electric 
cars, the total effect is not clear-cut. When electric car use is subsidized, it incentivizes the 
discharge of externalities from electric cars. A target for CO2 emission reductions can then 
conflict with the effective regulation of other externalities from car use. This can be especially 
problematic in urban areas in which congestion is considered the costliest externality in peak 
periods (Small, Verhoef, & Lindsey, 2007). Further, subsidies entail a cost to be covered 
elsewhere in the economy. 
 
Although electric cars do not emit CO2 on the road, the size of the environmental benefit from 
switching to electric cars depends on whether fossil or renewable sources are used in electricity 
generation (Jochem et al., 2016). Further, since an electric car takes up the same amount of 
space as a fossil car, electric cars are not a solution to the congestion problem. In a study from 
the US, Holland, Mansur, Muller & Yates (2016) argue that if only greenhouse gases are 
included in emission calculations, then compared to gasoline vehicles, electric cars provide a 
clear environmental benefit. However, if local pollution is accounted for, the results can be 
quite different. In areas with low population density and power generation based on coal firing, 
the damage from gasoline vehicles can be relatively low, while the environmental benefit from 
electric cars can be negative. In Norway, electricity generation comes almost exclusively from 
renewable sources. A generous support scheme ensured that Norway had the highest market 
share of electric vehicle sales in 2019 (IEA, 2020a). Electric cars receive substantial tax 
exemptions, prompting the argument that incentivizing electric cars is a costly way of reducing 
CO2 emissions (Bjertnæs, 2016). Cheaper electric cars may also incentivize people to use an 
electric car rather than public transport (Holtsmark, 2012). The support scheme may also create 
incentives for the procurement of heavier electric cars, which contribute considerably to local 
negative externalities, such as noise and the emission of particulate matter (Holtsmark, 2020). 
Timmers & Achten (2016) show a positive correlation between weight and non-exhaust 
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emissions for electric cars. They argue that future policy initiatives should focus on incentives 
for manufacturers and consumers to switch to lighter vehicles. 
 
4.3. A congestion tax for both car types 
In this section, we examine the situation in which a uniform congestion tax is introduced for 
both car types. Since congestion is considered to be the costliest externality in urban areas in 
peak periods (Small et al., 2007), this instrument can be appealing for regulators. The 
optimization problem reads as follows: 
 
min{cf +  g(xf + xe) + q, ce +  g(xf + xe) + q, cp + m(xp, y̅)} 
 
We obtain the following equilibrium condition, with the constraint of a fixed number of trips: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) + q = ce +  g(xf + xe) + q = cp + m(xp, y̅) (24)  
 
First, we observe the indifference conditions for the two car types: 
 
 cf +  g(xf + xe) + q = ce +  g(xf + xe) + q (25)  
 
The use of a congestion tax for both car types is an efficient way of handling congestion when 
the congestion tax is set at an effective level. However, if the level of the tax is too low, then 
congestion will be underpriced. We can see from (25) that the level of the congestion tax does 
not affect the distribution of commuters between the two car alternatives. If the congestion tax 
is equal for fossil and electric cars, there is no incentive for electric cars (assuming no 
governmental subsidies). Hence, we obtain the same solution as we did in the private solution, 
i.e., a corner solution with no electric cars in the new equilibrium. 
 
We can now compare the indifference conditions for fossil cars and public transport: 
 
 cf +  g(xf) + q = cp + m(xp, y̅) (26)  
 
























The use of a congestion tax results in a decrease in fossil car use and an increase in the use of 
public transport. The same result was shown in section 3.2.1. This leads to congestion, local 
pollution and CO2 emissions that are less than those in the case before the introduction of the 
congestion tax. However, the crowding aboard public transport will increase. The magnitude 
of these changes depends on the composition of fossil cars and public transport in the new 
equilibrium. Note that from (26), the congestion could be taxed so high that we obtain a corner 
solution in which the commuters only use public transport. However, this is not considered to 
be a realistic solution. 
 
Although a fossil and an electric car cause the same amount of congestion, this is not the case 
for the other externalities. With only a congestion tax, the other externalities are not 
internalized. Unlike the socially optimal solution, this equilibrium solution includes no electric 
cars. Whether there are too many fossil cars in equilibrium compared to the number of fossil 
cars in the socially optimal outcome depends on the level of the congestion tax. If it is set equal 
to the marginal externality cost of congestion, it is an effective instrument for this externality. 
However, the overall taxation is then too low, and there are too many fossil cars in the new 
equilibrium. Furthermore, there are no regulations on public transport use to internalize the 
crowding externality. 
 
Although congestion pricing alone is insufficient for an overall internalization of negative 
externalities from transport, it can be an efficient component in this regulation. However, since 
congestion pricing entails charging people for something that used to be free, it has not been 
unproblematic to implement (Small, 1992). Nevertheless, there are some notable examples 
where this instrument type has been introduced: Singapore (Chin, 2005), London (Leape, 2006; 
Litman, 2005), Stockholm (Börjesson, Eliasson, Hugosson, & Brundell-Freij, 2012), Norway 




The results show that uniform congestion pricing alone does not incentivize the use of electric 
cars over fossil cars. This incentivization could, however, be done with differentiated 
congestion taxes. In Norway, electric cars cannot be charged more than 50 percent of the 
congestion tax for fossil cars. However, since electric cars cause the same amount of congestion 
as a fossil car, a differentiated tax for congestion goes against the principle of effective 
congestion pricing. 
 
4.4. Electric cars allowed into the bus lane 
In the preceding sections, we have looked at economic instruments. A regulator can also use 
technical instruments (technology standards, emission-free zones, etc.). Here, we examine the 
scenario in which electric cars are allowed into the bus lane. This was one of the instruments 
introduced in Norway to stimulate the use of electric cars to reduce CO2 emissions. For 
simplicity, when electric cars are allowed into the bus lane, we assume that all electric car users 
choose this option. Hence, there is one congestion cost for fossil cars and another for electric 
cars. Further, electric cars cause congestion for other electric cars and public transport, but not 
the other way around7. The total congestion costs are additive, i.e., g(xf) + g(xe). The 
optimization problem reads as follows: 
 
min{cf +  g(xf), ce + g(xe), cp + g(xe) + m(xp, y̅)} 
 
With the binding constraint of a fixed number of trips, we obtain the following: 
 
 cf + g(xf) = ce +  g(xe) = cp + g(xe) + m(xp, y̅) (28)  
 
We begin by comparing the indifference conditions for fossil and electric cars: 
 
 cf + g(xf) = ce +  g(xe) (29)  
 
When electric cars drive in the bus lane, their congestion costs are unaffected by the number of 
fossil cars. Likewise, the congestion costs for fossil cars are solely determined by the number 
of fossil cars. With identical functional forms for the congestion costs, the equilibrium condition 
in (29) holds if g(xf) > g(xe). In the private solution in section 3.1., we obtained the corner 
 
7 A similar assumption is made in (Strøm & Vislie, 2008). 
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solution that there would be no electric cars. From (29), however, we have that if electric cars 
are allowed into the bus lane, then in equilibrium, commuters will choose both fossil and 
electric cars and that most of the car users prefer fossil cars. 
 
We can also compare the indifference conditions for electric cars and public transport: 
 
 ce +  g(xe) = cp + g(xe) + m(xp, y̅) (30)  
 
We can see from (30) that now there is an additional cost for public transport when electric cars 
create congestion in the bus lane. We have assumed that ce < cp. For the equality in (30) to 
hold, we must have the following: ce = cp + m(xp, y̅). Obviously, this cannot hold. Hence, we 
obtain a corner solution in which commuters choose either fossil or electric cars in the new 
equilibrium. This is a very strong assumption since there are always some commuters who 
cannot or will not choose private transport. Further, the corner solution is a result of the 
functional forms used. However, the result shows that when facing congestion costs from cars, 
public transport loses an important advantage over private transport. 
 
When electric cars are allowed into the bus lane, this results in a displacement of public 
transport in favor of private transport. With a fixed number of commuters, this displacement 
results in congestion, local pollution, and crowding greater than those in the case before the 
implementation of the technical instrument. The magnitude of these reductions depends on the 
composition of fossil and electric cars in the new equilibrium. Whether CO2 emissions increase 
or decrease depends upon the distribution of commuters between the two car types. However, 
since congestion costs for fossil cars now only depend on other fossil cars, our results suggest 
that there could be an increase in CO2 emissions as well. 
 
A comparison with the outcome in section 3.1.1., shows that allowing electric cars in the bus 
lane is not an effective instrument for reducing the externalities from road transport. In section 
4.2., we discussed the implications of subsidizing electric car use and showed that this could be 
a costly way of reducing CO2 emissions. At the same time, it incentivized externalities from 
electric car use. In this section, we find that if electric cars are allowed into the bus lane, not 
only will they inflict congestion costs on public transport and displace this alternative, but fossil 




5. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we examine the problem of transport choice for commuters in a congested urban 
area. We analyze the long-run equilibrium conditions under the situation in which the negative 
externalities are not internalized. Then, we move from the private to the socially optimal 
solution, in which the externalities are internalized, and examine this new equilibrium. The 
commuters use either a fossil car, an electric car or public transport. Each mode of transport is 
responsible for a different composition of negative externalities. We discuss how the regulator 
can achieve an optimal internalization of the externalities, stressing the use of economic 
principles for efficient regulation. This is highlighted by analyzing outcomes from partial 
instrument use and by conducting comparative statics, allowing us to compare different long-
run outcomes. 
 
The regulator can optimally internalize the externalities with four economic instruments: a CO2 
tax for fossil cars, a differentiated local pollution tax for both car types, a uniform congestion 
tax for both car types, and a mark-up on the public transport fare to account for crowding aboard 
the public transport service. Further, we show the results when the regulator strays from this 
strategy of coherent and targeted regulation. 
 
We study four examples in which the regulator uses a strategy of partial instrument use. Three 
economic instruments are considered: a tax on fossil cars, a subsidy for electric cars, and a 
congestion tax for both car types. Finally, we look at a technical instrument under which electric 
cars are allowed into the bus lane. We analyze the long-run equilibriums from these regulation 
choices and show that compared to the socially optimal outcome, each outcome results in 
insufficient regulation. A strategy of partial regulation can also cause unintended consequences. 
The subsidization of electric car use may seem to be an appealing way to reduce CO2 emissions, 
but it can be both costly and come into conflict with the regulation of other externalities. 
Further, allowing electric cars into the bus lane not only creates congestion for public transport 
but also can incentivize the use of fossil cars by reducing their congestion costs as well. 
 
Our results are derived from a stylized model using simplified functional forms and in which 
several assumptions have been made. There are a fixed number of trips taken. Further, all 
commuters have a fixed utility for the trip (but not necessarily the same utility). Since the trip 
is deemed essential, to secure an economic outcome, utility is always of greater order than the 
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minimized cost of making the trip. This means that for all commuters, it is not an alternative to 
opt out of making the trip. In addition, we have partly abstracted away from some types of 
negative externalities from public transport use. Further, in our analysis, we have discussed the 
economic principles of regulation to achieve a socially optimal outcome. In practice, however, 
there could be political and public constraints restricting the regulators’ choice of instruments. 
Concerns about equity, technology and privacy are recurring objections. 
 
However, with the potentially large social costs stemming from transport-related externalities, 
the discussion of effective regulation is clearly important. Our results highlight the significance 
of transport choice to the contribution of negative externalities and discuss important economic 
principles for effective regulation. These principles entail the implementation of coherent 
regulation and the use of a “sandwich” of economic instruments. The implemented instruments 
should be derived such that they both target in a direct way the externalities and are 
























A. Functional forms and expressions used in the model 
Symbol Description 
u̅ Individual utility of travel (fixed) 
x̅ Total number of trips (fixed) 
xf Total number of trips by fossil cars 
xe Total number of trips by electric cars 
xp Total number of trips by public transport 
y̅ Capacity limit for public transport 
cf Imputed unit cost of a fossil car 
ce Imputed unit cost of an electric car 
cp Imputed unit cost of public transport 
g(xf + xe)(xf + xe) Total congestion costs from car use, with 
g′(xf + xe) > 0 and g′′(xf + xe) ≥ 0 
g(xf + xe) Average congestion costs 
g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) Marginal congestion costs, 
h(xf + αxe) Local pollution cost, with h′(xf + αxe) > 0 
and h′′(xf + αxe) ≥ 0 
α Damage intensity for an electric car, with 0 < α < 1 
e Marginal CO2 emission from fossil car use 
m(xp, y̅) Crowding cost function for public transport, with 
m𝑥𝑝
′ (xp, y̅) > 0,my̅
′ (xp, y̅) < 0 and mxp
′′ (xp, y̅) ≥ 0 
i(y̅) Investment function for public transport capacity, 
withi′(y̅) > 0 
t Tax on fossil car use 
s Subsidy provided for electric car use 
q Congestion tax for both car types 
 
B. Private solution – effects of increased congestion costs 





 cf +  γg(xf) = cp + m(xp, y̅) B.I.  
 


















C. Private solution – effects of increased crowding costs 
We denote the cost increase 𝛿 and obtain the following equilibrium condition: 
 
 cf +  g(xf) = cp + δm(xp, y̅) C.I.  
 


















D. Socially optimal solution – effects of increased congestion costs 
The increase in congestion costs is denoted by μ. The equilibrium condition is then as follows: 
 
 cf + e +  μg(xf + xe) + μg′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe)
= ce +  μg(xf + xe) + μg′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + αh′(xf + αxe)
= cp + m(xp, y̅) + mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp 
D.I.  
 
Denoting Z = (2μg′ + μg′′(xf + xe) + h′′ + 2m′ + mxp
′′ xp), the condition in D.I. can be 
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E. Socially optimal solution – effects of increased costs of CO2 emissions 
With the cost increase denoted η, the equilibrium condition reads as follows: 
 
 cf + ηe +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe)
= ce +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + αh′(xf + αxe)
= cp + m(xp, y̅) + mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp 
E.I.  
 
Denoting Z = (2g′ + g′′(xf + xe) + h′′ + 2m′ + mxp
′′ xp), the condition in E.I. can be written 
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F. Socially optimal solution – effects of increased local pollution costs 
The increase in local pollution costs is denoted by φ. The equilibrium condition then reads as 
follows: 
 
 cf + e +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + φh′(xf + αxe)
= ce +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + αφh′(xf + αxe)
= cp + m(xp, y̅) + mxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp 
F.I.  
 
Denoting Z = (2g′ + g′′(xf + xe) + φh′′ + 2m′ + mxp
′′ xp), the condition in F.I. can be written 
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G. Socially optimal solution – effects of increased crowding costs 
The increase in crowding costs is denoted ω, and the equilibrium condition reads as follows: 
 
 cf + e +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + h′(xf + αxe)
= ce +  g(xf + xe) + g′(xf + xe)(xf + xe) + αh′(xf + αxe)
= cp + ωm(xp, y̅) + ωmxp
′ (xp, y̅)xp 
G.I.  
 
Denoting Z = (2g′ + g′′(xf + xe) + h′′ + 2ωm′ + ωmxp
′′ xp), the condition in G.I. can be 
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